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OUR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES: EQUALITY IN SEX 
EDUCATION, CONTRACEPTIVE ACCESS, AND WORK-
FAMILY POLICY 
Cornelia T.L. Pillara 
Reproductive rights are traditionally understood to be protected by the 
privacy aspect of the due process liberty guarantee, but equal protection is also 
at the heart of the matter. Many of us intuitively know the close relationship 
between sex equality and abortion rights, and the law, too, is starting to reflect 
it. This Symposium broadens the focus of traditional abortion-rights 
jurisprudence to develop equality-based analyses of abortion rights. Widening 
the angle even further, this Article looks at sex equality and reproductive rights 
issues beyond the core right to abortion. 
Bringing into the picture issues beyond abortion helps to show the close 
and mutually reinforcing relationship between sex equality and reproductive 
rights. In fuller context, we see how reproductive rights are a hinge pin 
between liberty and equality: Women need practical access to a range of 
reproductive choices to enjoy sex equality, yet they need equality to make 
reproductive decisions freely and in ways that are responsible to themselves, 
those they love, and the broader society. Even with the abortion right 
protected under Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, sex inequality and discrimination make that right alone 
inadequate to secure reproductive choice equally for all women-young and 
mature, poor and rich, rural and urban. I Making law's existing promise of 
reproductive freedom effective for more women is a critical part of securing it 
in years to come. 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Helen Alvare, Ederlina Co, 
David D. Cole. Anne Dailey, Reva Seigel, and Robin West for their comments on drafts of this Article. 
I See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCfION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Angela Hooten, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing 
Mainstream and Latina Feminism, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 59,60, 86 (2005); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Politics and Pregnancy: Adolescent Mothers and Public Policy, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 
99, 99-100, 127-31 (1992); Julie F. Kay, Note, If Men Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protection Model for 
Federal Funding of Abortion Under a National Health Care Plan, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 349, 365--Q6 (1994) 
(highlighting limitations imposed on reproductive choice by geographic as well as financial obstacles to 
abortion). 
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Paradoxically, while reproductive rights should be doubly constitutionally 
protected by the overlapping liberty and equality guarantees, that dual pedigree 
can instead leave reproductive rights more vulnerable. Arguments from 
equality may be weakened by the sense that laws and policies need not change 
to be fairer to women if, supplied with the liberty to control fertility and have 
abortions, women thereby become "just like men." Meanwhile, to the extent 
that reproductive rights are important because they advance sex equality, 
support for abortion and other reproductive rights can be deflected into efforts 
to make society more equal in other ways for women, including women with 
children. We must eschew that shell game because the truth is that 
reproductive rights are important both for the reasons that the Constitution 
recognizes liberty rights to privacy and bodily integrity and for the reasons that 
it recognizes the right to sex equality. 
To highlight some of the opportunities created by bringing equality 
analysis more fully into the mix, this Article looks at three distiryct, 
reproduction-related sites of sex discrimination: sex-role stereotyping in sex 
education, insurance policy exclusions of women's contraceptive health care, 
and shortfalls in work-family policies in our historically male-oriented labor 
market. The sex education discussion in Part I criticizes abstinence-only-until-
marriage sex education curricula. It brings into focus those curricula's 
persistent, official promulgation of retrogressive, anti-egalitarian sexual 
ideologies-of male pleasure and female shame, male recreation and female 
responsibility, male agency and female passivity, and male personhood and 
female parenthood. I argue for a counter-stereotyping sex education that 
affirms women's and men's desire, sexual agency, and responsibility. The 
same principles that presumptively forbid other kinds of sex-based official 
action should prevent public schools from training students in accordance with 
double standards and stereotyping-training that also impairs reproductive 
justice. 
Part II, on contraceptive equity, illuminates the persistence of conflicting 
legal approaches in equality law to women's capacity to become pregnant: One 
sees pregnancy as an incidental, gender-neutral fact about some people that can 
be disfavored without raising equality problems, whereas the other 
comprehends discrimination based on reproductive distinctiveness as a core, 
constitutive aspect of sex inequality. The law should clearly affirm women's 
right to use contraception to control when and whether they become pregnant 
as an indispensable element of sex equality. 
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Finally, the work-family discussion identifies the lack of realistic 
opportunities to both nurture children and work for pay as a major concern for 
sex equality and reproductive rights. At its best, equality law would seek to 
minimize the extent to which social policy on work and family limits women's 
full economic and political citizenship and men's relationships of care for 
children and other dependents. Each of these three issues presents concrete 
and critical opportunities for deploying equality law and egalitarian cultural 
norms in support of reproductive justice. 
Defining reproductive rights broadly to include issues like sex education, 
contraceptive access, and work-family policy is necessary because the 
unwantedness of a pregnancy and the demand for abortion do not occur in a 
vacuum. Various forms of inequality and stereotyping contribute to a status 
quo in which many women get pregnant in circumstances in which they either 
do not want children, or want children yet feel they cannot have them. Girls 
and women disproportionately are taught to be in denial about their own sexual 
urges, and yet rely inappropriately on their sex appeal. The denial occurs both 
ways: Women are expected to deny the presence of their sexual desire (to 
guard chastity), and to deny its absence (to be sexually responsive to men). In 
a world in which such denial is the norm, women will lack the kind of agency 
and responsibility needed to meet their own desires for pleasure, well-being, 
support, and meaning in their lives. When the vast majority of women are 
(hetero)sexually active, yet women-controlled contraception is not recognized 
as a basic component of health care, it should not be surprising that millions of 
women face unwanted pregnancies. Society tolerates unbridled and even 
aggressive male sexuality as "natural" or lauds it as strong. Society valorizes 
lack of female desire, even while considering that lack inevitable, and so 
irrelevant, when women's lack of desire does not match male wants. People 
generally still view child rearing as women's gratification and their domain, 
and accept men's failure to do and value it as personal, private choice, off-
limits to criticism. Both abstinence-only sex education and insurance 
noncoverage of contraception help to sustain that status quo. If those 
circumstances do not change, men will continue to fail to take their part of the 
responsibility for sexual intercourse and its potentially lifelong consequences, 
and women will continue to accede to sex inequality structured around and 
rationalized in terms of reproduction. 
Reproductive choice is not only about avoiding unwanted pregnancy, but 
also about having wanted children. The paucity of family-friendly workplace 
policy in the United States is a major issue, not only of sex equality, but also of 
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reproductive rights. People who might want children should not be forced to 
choose between nurturing a family and earning the income needed to support 
it. Our law, institutional arrangements, and culture need to be restyled so that 
mothers are not routinely "mommy tracked," men are prompted to share in 
caretaking, and workplace and social-welfare policies support women and men 
equally to realize their potential at home and work. The failures of our law, 
policy, and culture to do more to enable women and men alike to be both direct 
caregivers and successful working people interferes with genuine reproductive 
choice-and sex equality-for all. 
The broader focus advocated here also seeks common cause between 
people opposed to legal abortion and those who support the abortion right. 
Importantly, in each of the three areas explored in this Article, the life of the 
fetus-the crux of the moral controversy over abortion-is not implicated. In 
each area, if society were more willing to recognize the demands of equality, 
there might well be less need for abortion. Equality analysis can help to 
encourage sexual agency and responsibility, facilitate access to contraceptives 
for both sexes, and make parenting more attractive than abortion by making it 
less impoverishing and disempowering for women and a greater priority for 
men. Abortion opponents and advocates alike should favor extending sex 
equality norms in these and related areas? 
It makes sense to view equality law as a source of support for reproductive 
rights in part because, while abortion rights in the United States have been 
rolled back since the 1980s, the law of sex equality has gained momentum here 
and abroad. Equality law has coalesced around a vision of women and men 
equally entitled to pursue chosen goals with respect to education, work, 
intimacy, and family, and equally obligated to shoulder the duties that our 
citizenship and our actions incur. Equal protection's basic commitment to the 
principle that biology need not determine destiny means that women (and men) 
must have equal life chances even though the sexes are biologically distinct. 
In particular, equality law increasingly apprehends the central role that both 
expectations about maternity and the realities of parenting play in sex 
discrimination. The legal project of enabling women and men freely to chart 
life courses without systematic, sex-based constraint confronts a long history 
and culture of traditional domesticity, which casts women primarily as mothers 
2 Equality analysis may also support the abortion right itself for many of the same reasons set forth here, 
but elaborating that argument in the specific context of abortion is beyond the scope of this Article. Such 
analysis presumably would reinforce the abortion right and accommodate exceedingly persuasive 
governmental interests in maternal health and fetal life. 
HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 945 2006-2007
2007] OUR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 945 
and family caretakers, and men primarily as breadwinners unfettered by direct 
family-care responsibilities. Courts and legislatures have shown some· 
initiative in breaking down the sex-based "maternal wall" that has cabined 
women's progress in the labor market, and have begun to hint at how the law 
needs to open the way for men and women better to share responsibilities at 
home. Under the legally dominant, modern vision of sex equality, individuals 
may agree to live out their own sexuality or sex roles in ways that might strike 
others as stereotypical, traditional, innovative, or even radic.al. The law, 
however, assumes and protects the equal rights and opportunities of women 
and men by working to foster and assure official neutrality and to repudiate a 
decidedly nonneutral legal history regarding the roles that members of either 
sex might play in sexuality, work, and family. 
It is not just because equality rights are strong and abortion rights are under 
attack that it makes sense for reproductive rights advocates to turn to equal 
protection, but also because sex equality is fundamentally at stake in 
controversies over reproductive law and policy. Reproductive rights, including 
the rights to contraception and abortion, play a central role in freeing women 
from historically routine conscription into maternity. It is reproductive rights 
that have begun to allow women to decide whether and when to follow the 
path of motherhood. Our Constitution declares our liberty to protect our own 
life and health. As a society we have the knowledge to educate young people 
about reproduction, the means to prevent and in some circumstances to end 
unwanted pregnancies, and the social resources to support parenting. At this 
point in our history, women's equality is infringed when such reproductive 
freedoms are denied without forceful governmental justification. 
The turn to equality found some impetus in the joint opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 3 Casey recognized that 
women's ability "to participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." 4 
In reaffirming the core of the abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade,5 Casey 
linked the abortion right to the constitutional prohibition against government 
3 505 u.s. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, joined in relevant part 
by Justices Blackmun and Stevens). In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), decided as this issue 
went to press, the four dissenting justices emphasized that abortion rights claims "center on a woman's 
autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature." Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). The Carhart majority opinion did not discuss the equality implications of abortion rights. 
4 Casey, 505 U.S. at 835. 
5 410 U.S. 113(\973). 
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assigning women the traditional, gendered social roles of wife and mother-a 
prohibition that is increasingly understood to lie at the heart of equal 
protection.6 Under abortion laws, 
the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human 
condition and so unique to the law. . .. Her suffering is too intimate 
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision 
of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the 
course of our history and our culture.7 
Antiabortion laws and other restraints on reproductive freedom not only 
enforce women's incubation of unwanted pregnancies, but also prescribe a 
"vision of the woman's role" as mother and caretaker of children in a way that 
is at odds with equal protection. 
Although the Court's recognition of the connection between equality and 
reproductive rights has been incipient and fragile, equality is a natural 
conceptual partner to liberty in support of reproductive choice. Renewed 
attacks on abortion have turned attention to how the Equal Protection Clause, 
and the right to sex equality more generally, might advance reproductive self-
determination. Controversy and conflict about abortion has also led some of us 
to seek new areas of agreement and better ways to move forward together. The 
tum to equality, properly understood, has the potential to do more than provide 
an alternative defense of reproductive rights; it brings into the open a truth that 
millions have experienced, which is that reproductive rights really are 
fundamentally about sex equality. Equality analysis offers promising avenues 
to enlist more support for the project of making reproductive justice, and the 
sex equality it underwrites, a reality for all. 
l. SEX EDUCATION: THE EQUALITY RIGHT AGAINST INCULCATION OF SEX-
BASED DOUBLE STANDARDS 
Sex education lies at the crossroads between reproductive rights and sex 
equality. It is at once about sexuality (feelings and actions relating to "having 
sex"), sex (being anatomically male or female), and gender (the cultural 
meanings associated with maleness and femaleness). Sex education is a 
critical site of acculturation regarding both reproduction and sex roles. 
Tinkering with sex education is risky business because of our deep, passionate, 
6 See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,730-31 (2003). 
7 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
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personal, and powerfully conflicting norms on those matters, 8 and because sex 
can be a source of danger as well as pleasure.9 Because sex education's very 
purpose is to affect young people's understandings and behavior, however, it 
provides an opportunity for change. 10 
The new trend in sex education in the United States is away from 
comprehensive sex education and toward abstinence-only-until-marriage 
curricula, which advocate that refraining from sexual aCtiVIty until 
heterosexual marriage is the sole acceptable form of sexual behavior. Those 
curricula include only negative information about birth control and abortion, 
such as contraceptive failure rates and assertions of adverse health 
consequences of abortion. They omit the fuller information traditionally 
provided in comprehensive sex education on the ground that it tacitly 
encourages premarital teen sex, which abstinence-only proponents view as 
immoral and harmful. Abstinence-only curricula receive large and growing 
blocks of federal funding and are already taught in one third of America's sex 
education classrooms. I I Progressives criticize abstinence-only programs as 
8 See generally JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX: THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2004); KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX-AND SEX 
EDUCATION-SINCE THE SIXTIES (2006); Sharon Lerner, The Sex·Ed Divide, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2001, at 
A15. 
9 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
(1987) (decrying the reality of pervasive rape, incest, and other forms of sexual abuse perpetrated by men 
against women); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149 (1989) 
(arguing that patriarchy is expressed and maintained through sexualized dominance); Carole S. Vance, More 
Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289 
(1993) (describing the conundrum posed by feminists' appreciation that sex can both pose danger and promise 
pleasure to women). 
10 The intensity of the controversy over sex education might seem disproportionate to the stakes because 
sex education in schools is only a fragment of the information and socialization that influences young people's 
approaches to sex and gender. Given the volume and complexity of other influences, exactly what is taught in 
sex education class may matter less than we think. Those limitations must qualify my own claims as well. 
The relationship between legal and cultural change is complex, and by focusing on the former, I do not mean 
to imply otherwise. Nonetheless, the fact that sex education in the public schools is such a "hot button" issue 
suggests that people pay special attention to authoritative, public positions on sex, gender, and youth. Sex 
education in public school remains vitally important because schools are one of the few places where 
constitutional equality norms can be brought to bear directly to help young people to get fair and accurate 
information about sex. 
II Three major sources of funding for abstinence-only curricula are: (I) the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 42 U.S.c. § 710(b) (2000) (providing funding to 
states for abstinence-only curricula), (2) Special Programs of Regional and National Significance/Community-
Based Abstinence Education (SPRANS/CBAE), see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Administration for Children and Families, Fact Sheet: Community-Based Abstinence Education Program, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/contentlabstinence/community.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006) 
(providing funding directly to community organization for abstinence-only programs, funded by the FY 2005 
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inaccurate and as counterproductive in avoiding unwanted pregnancy and 
sexually transmitted disease,12 but scholars and advocates have paid inadequate 
attention to those curricula's propagation of sex stereotypes and double 
standards. 
The abstinence-only approach is permeated with stereotyped messages and 
sex-based double standards about acceptable male and female sexual behavior 
and appropriate social roles. Public school teaching of gender stereotypes 
violates the constitutional bar against sex stereotyping and is vulnerable to 
equal protection challenge. The equality defect is also related to the more 
vocal objections that abstinence-only curricula are ineffective: Teaching sex-
stereotyped behavior undermines the shared sense of agency and responsibility 
that young people need to avoid coerced or unwanted sex, unplanned and 
unprotected sex, and unwanted pregnancy. 
The Supreme Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence sets a very high 
bar against sex-based stereotyping and overgeneralization. Under a line of 
cases culminating in United States v. Virginia (VMl),13 even statistically 
accurate generalizations about "typically male or female tendencies"-such as 
men's greater aggressiveness versus women's comparatively more cooperative 
temperament, or men's tendency to harass and women's victimization by sex 
harassment--cannot be grounds for official, sex-based discrimination. 14 VMI 
builds on a long line of precedent that treats even laws enacted ostensibly to 
favor or protect women as unconstitutionally discriminatory due in large part 
to the stereotypes they perpetuate. The doctrine often seems more centrally 
concerned with the metastatic potential of sex-role stereotyping that sex-based 
disparate treatment reflects and reinforces than with the often benign or 
minimal concrete differences in treatment themselves. It thus recognizes that 
sex-role stereotyping is itself harmful because it projects patriarchal messages 
that make discrimination at once more likely and less apparent. 
appropriations bill and administered under the authority of PRWORA by the Department of Health and Human 
Services), and (3) the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), 42 U.S.c. § 300z (2000). These sources account 
for $167 million budgeted for 2005. See H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 108TH CONG., THE CONTENT OF 
FEDERALLY fuNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 1-4 (Comm. Print 2004), available at 
http://www.democrats.reform.house.govlDocumentsl20041201102153-50247.pdf (prepared for Rep. Henry A. 
Waxman) (describing extent of funding for and adoption of those curricula). 
12 LUKER, supra note 8, at 238. 
13 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
14 [d. at 541, 544, 550. 
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Constitutional resistance to stereotyping springs from equal protection 
values of fair treatment of people as individuals, opposition to systemic gender 
hierarchy, and the pragmatic challenges of breaking down patriarchy and 
reimagining a society without it. Given the vast overlap between women's and 
men's characteristics, as well as the wide range within each sex, individuals' 
actual qualities very often are gender atypical (although our own confirmation 
biases may make that harder to notice). When government acts in ways that 
routinely deny that reality, it disrespects our individual humanity. Equal 
protection opposes sex-based disregard of individual qualities in part because 
that disregard reinforces historically entrenched gender hierarchy. 
Stereotyping makes patterns of inequality seem more natural, inevitable, and 
even invisible. A history of imaginations and opportunities circumscribed by 
perceptions of "average" or "typical" male versus female sex characteristics, 
and habits of exaggerating the relevance and scope of sex differences, are part 
of the architecture of patriarchal systems. Antistereotyping doctrine helps to 
break those habits to permit us to move beyond that history. 
It may yet seem perverse that equal protection doctrine goes to so much 
trouble to resist factually based generalizations about the sexes when they are, 
by and large, accurate. Why do the Supreme Court cases insist so firmly on 
the possibility of gender atypicality? One function of antistereotyping 
doctrine's special protection of space for gender atypicality is to help to deal 
with challenges posed for sex equality theory by the social construction of 
gender. We are all powerfully socialized to replicate current gender 
arrangements and to accept them as "natural." The remarkable human 
adaptability even to onerous and unjust circumstances, meanwhile, blunts our 
antennae for inequality. 15 Those well-documented phenomena-gender 
socialization and adaptive preferences--combine to make it difficult to 
anticipate what sex equality will look like, and consequently to know quite 
how best to seek it. Gender atypicality is thus especially important and 
liberating in helping us to experience and envision the possibilities; 
anti stereotyping doctrine is its legal protection. 
Despite its strong support in recent constitutional doctrine, however, the 
anti stereotyping theory is also in tension with one older equal protection 
precedent on regulation of teenage sexuality. A plurality of the Supreme Court 
15 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109-40 (1983); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Inteiference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131, 1138-39, 
1146-48 (1986). 
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in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County sustained a California law 
criminalizing men's but not women's participation in "statutory rape"-i.e., 
intercourse with a rninor. 16 The statute and the Court's opinion relied on and 
reinforced the very stereotypes of women's passivity and men's agency in sex 
that I argue the Constitution rejects. The opinion justified the statute's 
applicability only to men on the ground that "males alone can physiologically 
cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid,,,17 even though as 
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, "the risk-creating conduct that this 
statute is designed to prevent requires the participation of two persons-one 
male and one female.,,18 The plurality also embraced the double standard that 
women's chastity, more than men's, should be an object of governmental 
solicitude. Underage sex is distinctively a "problem" for women, the opinion 
suggested,19 and accepted that some legislators were seeking to protect "young 
females [but not males] from ... the loss of chastity.,,20 The state's post-hoc 
assertion of an interest in exempting girls to encourage them to report 
violations is constitutionally offensive in its assignment of a sexual gatekeeper 
function to girls only. Under Michael M., girls, and not boys, qualify as "sex 
police," without regard to their actual level of responsibility in a violation?1 
16 450 u.s. 464 (1981) (plurality). 
17 Id. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18 Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 469 (plurality) ("fA] legislature may provide for the special problems of women.") (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
20 Id. at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plurality accepted the state's asserted interest in 
pregnancy prevention without evidence of any relative ineffectiveness of sex-neutral statutory rape laws, 
which equally prohibit women from seducing young and nai"ve men. The plurality tellingly concluded that the 
California law "reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall 
more heavily on the female than on the male." Id. at 476; see also id. at 479 (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(referring to sexes being differently situated with respect to "intercourse and pregnancy") (emphases added). 
Those justices apparently viewed intercourse as a problem for underage women, even apart from unwanted 
pregnancy, because they understood it to impugn women's virtue in a way that it did not for their male peers. 
21 For all its discussion of protecting young women, Michael M. implicitly underscores the law's 
inadequacy in protecting women who "ask for it." Women's well-founded fear that they will be branded as 
licentious and will not be believed is a much larger deterrent to the reporting of sex offenses than is any risk of 
prosecution under sex-neutral statutory rape laws. Prosecutors rely on statutory rape laws in part as 
alternatives to full-blown rape charges where lack of consent may be hard to prove. In Michael M., the 
apparent difficulty with the rape charge was that Sharon (age 17) initially walked down the railroad tracks with 
the defendant (age 18), lay on a bench with him and willingly kissed him. When she told him to stop and tried 
to get up, he slugged her in the face two or three times, pushed her down on the bench and proceeded to force 
his penis into her vagina anyway. See 450 U.S. at 483 and n.* (Blackman, 1., concurring in the judgment) 
(testimony from preliminary hearing). Perhaps it was because her initial conduct seemed so horny (or "slutty," 
as the sexual double standard would have it) that prosecutors thought a jury would find her effectively 
ineligible to say "no" to intercourse. The case was tried as statutory rape, to which consent is deemed 
irrelevant. The sexual double standards that Michael M. helps to sustain are themselves factors in the 
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Constitutional analysis of stereotyping in sex education pits VMl's 
aspirational egalitarianism against Michael M's more fearful gender 
protectionism; whether through narrow construction or overruling of Michael 
M., it is the anti stereotyping principle of VMI that should apply. The double 
standards about sexuality and sex roles in abstinence-only education are as 
widespread and harmful as those the Court has confidently rejected in the 
whole line of antistereotyping cases. Men's lust has long been stereotyped as a 
powerful, natural force, and male virility celebrated, whereas women have 
been characterized as the objects of men's desires rather than subjects of their 
own. Women who express their sexual desire have historically been 
denigrated as dirty, threatening "sluts" or "whores," and women who have sex 
outside of marriage have been typed as "fallen," "ruined," "damaged," not 
"good girls," or "not marriage material"-terms simply not used against 
sexually active young men. Historically, men have been thought to have a 
primitive sexuality "that constantly [seeks] outlet," in contrast to women's 
"more civilized, contingent sexuality that [can] be subordinated to the needs of 
both family and society.'.22 Traditionally, sex could be a source of pleasure 
and power for men; for women it has been associated with risk and shame. 
Public schools have a constitutional responsibility to avoid inculcating students 
with those harmful stereotypes. 
The reproductive-rights stakes in sex education are significant. The choice 
between a stereotyped and an egalitarian path can influence whether women 
and men learn to deal with one another as equals and take responsibility for 
sexuality and procreative capacity, or whether they live out existing sexual 
double standards that help to foster, among other ills, sexual coercion and high 
rates of unwanted pregnancy. Sexual double standards set up both young 
women and men to act irresponsibly. The notion that male sex drives are 
irrepressible, the valorization of male sexual "conquests," and the failure to 
hold men accountable to care for the children they father all encourage 
heedless and even lawless male sexual behavior, destructive male-to-male peer 
pressure, and disregard of women's humanity?3 Relying on young women to 
underenforcement of rape and sexual abuse laws. The antidote to that rests not in exempting females from 
legal sanctions, but in rejecting the culture of disparate shaming of females about sex, and, more generally, in 
reforms that decrease the extent to which women remain beholden to the men who coerce them. 
22 LUKER, supra note 8, at 56. 
23 Abetting unwanted impregnation of women is not the only way that sex role stereotypes harmfully 
implicate men. Stereotyping is itself insulting and limiting for men, cabining them into restrictive roles and 
stigmatizing those who stray from masculine gender norms. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy alld Illequality: 
Towards a Substallfive Femillism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 24 (theorizing patriarchy as a system of "male 
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be the gatekeepers of chastity and to respond with denial and shame to their 
own sexual drives, touting motherhood as their best destiny, and encouraging 
women to care more about their relationships with men than their own plans 
intensify women's ambivalence and difficulty in negotiating their own drives, 
desires, and best interests.24 Failure to acknowledge women's very real and 
powerful sexual urges also abets sexual abuse and rape: If women are taught to 
deny their desire, their "no's" appear ambiguous, maiGng it easier for men to 
believe that "no means yes"-i.e., that male insistence will merely lead to what 
both "really" want. The female chastity norm also punishes women who 
repudiate it-or are presumed to do so-by viewing them as "fair game," 
disentitled to protection from uninvited sex. That negative implication is 
deeply racialized: Black women and other women of color, who are considered 
promiscuous by nature and thus ineligible for the chastity pedestal, have 
consistently been unprotected or underprotected against sexual abuse?5 
It is not an option in sex education to say nothing about sex stereotypes. 
Gender and sex roles have become pervasive topics, both implicitly and 
explicitly, in sex education curricula. Historically, basic sex education taught 
students about the fundamentals of human sexuality, including menstruation, 
the reproductive process, and, increasingly, the avoidance of unwanted 
pregnancy and disease?6 Sex education in the United States has moved 
beyond those anatomical basics, however, as schools have responded to 
students' need for guidance on how to navigate the social, emotional, and 
ethical shoals of sex and sexuality.27 Sex education that discusses such matters 
inevitably also addresses gender roles. Once that door is open, either 
traditional gender roles are accepted and reinforced, or the risks of stereotyping 
must be made explicit and restrictive social generalizations about men and 
women challenged. 
distrust and fear of other men" that valorizes men's control and domination of other men); Mary Anne C. 
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1,3 (1995) (arguing that "[tJhe man who exhibits feminine qualities is doubly 
despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities and for descending from his masculine gender privilege to do 
so"). And men, too, are victims of the kinds of sexual aggression that patriarchal cultures foster. See Marc 
Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,52 (2004). 
24 See Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire, 
58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29, 30-43 (1988); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, 
and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182-83,206-08 (2001); see also Michelle Fine & Sara I. McClelland, 
Sexuality Education and Desire: Still Missing After All These Years, 76 HAKv. EDUC. REv. 297 (2006). 
25 See generally IGmberie Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 
1470 (1992). 
26 IRVINE, supra note 8; LUKER, supra note 8, at 201. 
27 LUKER, supra note 8, at 85-86. 
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As social context has joined the technical details in sex education courses, 
however, sex education conservatives have mobilized in protest against 
comprehensive sex education curricula. They have, with organizational 
effectiveness beyond their numbers, driven sex education toward "traditional 
values" and have won substantial governmental support for abstinence-only 
curricula. Sex education conservatives generally believe that women and men 
should play distinct roles in sexuality, family, and the labor market. For them, 
females' chastity is more important than males'; responsibility for guarding 
chastity is assigned particularly to females; marriage is the only proper venue 
for sexual intimacy; men's sex drive and sexual satisfaction is privileged while 
women's is demonized or ignored; and childrearing is viewed as primarily 
women's responsibility. These ideas are traditional, historically familiar, and 
often rooted in fundamentalist or other religious beliefs?8 
Abstinence-only curricula implicitly and explicitly perpetuate the 
stereotyped double standards of virility versus chastity, homemaker versus 
breadwinner, subject versus object of desire. According to popular abstinence-
only curricular materials, men have a naturally strong sex drive that women 
lack, and it is up to women to be the sexual gatekeepers. "A young man's 
natural desire for sex is already strong due to testosterone," one curriculum 
states; in contrast, women who "fantasize about sex" do so as a result of a 
regrettable process of having been "culturally conditioned.,,29 One curriculum 
cautions that "[a] man is usually less discriminating [than a woman] about 
those to whom he is physically attracted.,,30 The fact that a man might make 
sexual advances towards a woman does not necessarily mean that he cares for 
her, abstinence-only materials assert, but perhaps only that he sees her as an 
outlet for his sex drive.31 Men, the curricula hint, are only after that "one 
thing.,,32 Because male sex drive is so unrestrained, "[t]he girl may need to put 
28 [d. at 147, 159,228. 
29 Sexuality Information and Education Council of the U.S. (SIECUS), No New Money for Abstinence· 
Only-Until-Marriage Programs, In Their Own Words: What Abstinence-OnIY-Until-Marriage Programs Say, 
http://www.nonewmoney.orglownWords.html(last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (quoting COLEEN KELLY MAST, 
SEX RESPEcr: STUDENT WORKBOOK II (2001». 
30 [d. (quoting WAIT (WHY AM I TEMPTED) TRAINING, WORKSHOP MANUAL 37 (1998». 
31 [d. 
32 See, e.g., id. (quoting MAST, supra note 29, at 94) (teaching that "[a] guy who wants to respect girls is 
distracted by sexy clothes and remembers her for one thing" and further explaining that men are "turned on by 
their senses and women by their hearts"). The classic warning to young women that men are "only after one 
thing" encapsulates in a phrase familiar to millions of people a sexual double standard that weighs females', 
but not males', chastity as more important than their sexual fulfillment. See, e.g., Emily Maguire, Teenage 
Kicks, OBSERVER, Aug. 14,2005, at 4 (describing author's self-destructive reactions to her own adolescent sex 
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the brakes on first to help the boy.,,33 Nowhere are students warned about girls 
taking advantage of boys for kicks, or told that boys must also take 
responsibility to help girls restrain their lust. 
Double standards about sex drive and chastity in abstinence-only curricula 
are embedded in a larger picture of women and men playing traditional roles in 
the family and the public sphere. A decision to practice abstinence until 
marriage assumes early, heterosexual marriage and early childbearing.34 The 
expectation is not that marriage will be delayed until a person's late twenties or 
early thirties so that both parents can complete higher education and establish 
themselves at work, but that couples will marry young and the woman will 
become a family caretaker, principally supported by her husband, who remains 
relatively free of care-giving duties to pursue his career. Women, one 
abstinence-only curriculum teaches, need "financial support," whereas men 
need "domestic support" and "admiration. ,,35 Another maintains that 
"[ w ]omen gauge their happiness and judge their success on their relationships. 
Men's happiness and success hinge on their accomplishments.,,36 Young 
women, according to a leading abstinence-only curriculum, "care less about 
achievement and their futures" than do their male peers.37 These curricula 
suggest that there are two tracks in sex and two tracks in life, one male, and 
one female?8 
Because of strong differences of OpInIOn among parents about the 
appropriateness of abstinence-only versus comprehensive sex education, some 
schools now offer both and allow students and their families to choose, but this 
"choice" might itself exacerbate the sex-role stereotypes present within 
abstinence-only curricula. In a profile of a Minnesota school district's conflict 
drives in the face of sex education rife with double standards, including that "boys were only after one thing, 
and if you gave them that, you would never see them again") (emphasis added). 
33 SIECUS, supra note 29 (quoting MAUREEN GALLAGHER DURAN, REASONABLE REASONS TO WAIT: 
STUDENT WORKBOOK 96 (2002». 
34 It is one thing to remain abstinent until age 18 or 20, and quite another to foreswear sex until into one's 
thirties or, in the case of persons who do not or legally cannot marry, forever. 
35 COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note II, at 21 (quoting WAIT TRAINING, supra note 30, at 199). 
36 Id. at 16 (quoting Why kNOw, ABSTINENCE EDUCATION CURRICULUM 112 (2004». 
37 [d. at 16. 
38 Because sex education has become a political battlefield in the United States, some of the more value-
laden messages in sex education policy and curricula are expressed with circumspection. Sex education 
conservatives say they are seeking a return to the teaching of "traditional values." Of course, many traditional 
values-such as personal responsibility, interpersonal and self-respect, honesty and self-discipline, and even 
the wonder of adult sex in appropriate circumstances-are widely shared, uncontroversial, and appropriately 
taught in sex education courses. But in debates over sex education. "traditional values" also refers to a very 
controversial insistence on traditional gender roles. LUKER, supra note 8, at 227-28. 
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over sex education, Sharon Lerner observed a pattern that shows sex-based 
double standards writ large and institutionally reinforced: The girls 
disproportionately enroll (or are enrolled by their parents) in abstinence-only 
curricula, while boys disproportionately are enrolled in the comprehensive 
classes.39 Under such self-imposed "tracking," it is girls especially whom 
abstinence-only curricula protect from the "corrupting" force of information 
about sex, whereas boys are not thought to need such protection. Boys are put 
in charge of the facts, including information about birth control and abortion. 
Girls, disproportionately enrolled in the abstinence-only curricula, remain ill-
informed as they learn only the importance of abstinence until marriage, with 
no backup plan. They are groomed for their role as sexual gatekeepers and 
guardians of their own (more important) sexual chastity, even as, compared to 
their peers who receive a comprehensive sex education, they are left more 
vulnerable to unintended pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease.4o 
Many abstinence-only curricula were designed and are strongly supported 
by religious and conservative groups such as Focus on the Family and 
Concerned Women for America (CWA).41 These curricula's views of sex, 
sexuality, and sex roles closely track the priorities of such supporting 
organizations. CW A, a powerful abstinence-only proponent, consistently 
expresses support for "motherhood." CW A's advocacy exploits a useful 
ambiguity in the meaning of that word, referring both to the unassailable fact 
that women who bear children are mothers and to the traditional, sex-based 
assignment of women to the social role of primary family caregiver-a role 
that CW A particularly champions. For example, CW A opposes the 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDA W) because it is based on a conviction that, as CW A protests, "a 
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society 
and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and 
39 Lerner, supra note 8. 
40 On the correlation between abstinence curricula or pledges and risky behavior, see generally Hannah 
Bruckner & Peter Bearman, After the Promise: The STD Consequences of Adolescelll Virginity Pledges, 36 J. 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271, 277 (2005); DOUGLAS KIRBY, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, 
SUMMARY: EMERGING ANSWERS: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TEEN PREGNANCY 18 
(2001), http://www.teenpregnancy .org/resources/data/pdf/emerans wsum. pdf. 
41 See, e.g., Eva Arlia, Concerned Women for America, Abstinence Education's Amazing Progress (Nov. 
24, 2004), http://www.cwfa.org/articles/6919/BLl/commentary/index.htm; Linda Klepaki, Focus on the 
Family, Sex Education: Article Overview, http://www.family.org/socialissues/AOOO000360.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2007). 
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women.,,42 CWA decries the Convention's requirement that signatory nations 
"modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices ... based ... on stereotyped 
roles for men and women.,,43 CW A\s explicit in its opposition to such change, 
and in its commitment to win official support for maintenance of sex-
stereotyped roles and behavior. 
In sum, overt teachings and the pervasive subtext of abstinence-only 
curricula reflect the expectation that women should and will become mothers, 
rely on their husbands for financial support, care about their relationships with 
males more than the males do, have a greater stake in and identification with 
chastity than men, and do not value the importance of sexual release as highly 
as men do. By promulgating sexual double standards, those curricula foster a 
world view and behavior at odds with our equal protection law. Their 
prescriptions for women and men resonate vividly with the traditional sex roles 
that were the targets of so many of the early sex equality cases.44 
If it is contrary to equal protection to make even formally neutral 
governmental decisions based on sex stereotypes, it would seem, a fortiori, 
unconstitutional to teach those same views in public schools. There is, 
however, some doctrinal question whether teaching sex stereotypes is 
unconstitutional in the absence of an additional exclusion or denial of 
opportunity based on those stereotypes. If government must not act on the 
42 Wendy Wright, CEDA W: A Global Tool That Would Harm Women (Aug. 27, 2002), 
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=1871 &department=CW A&categoryid=nation (quoting Convention 
to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13). 
43 Id. (quoting CEDAW, supra note 42, at art. 5) (alteration in the original). An online feature on the 
Focus on the Family web site, another influential proponent of abstinence-only curricula, similarly asserts, for 
example, that men "are providers," care more about respect than about love, and "want more sex." Shaunti 
Feldhahn, What I Didn't Know About Men, http://www.family.org/marriage/AOOOOO0997.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2007). Understanding how the sexes differ, the feature claims, allows a woman to "better appreciate 
and support [her husband) in the way that he needs." /d. The web site's advice to women that "[m)en care 
about appearance," and that "your man does need to see you making the effort to take care of yourself - and he 
will take on significant cost or inconvenience in order to support you" sounds uncannily like a recipe for how 
to succeed as a 1950s housewife. 
44 Stereotypes that women were mothers in charge of farnily care and men were family breadwinners 
were the targets in numerous equal protection cases, for example, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,204-07 
(1977) (invalidating Social Security Act survivors' benefits scheme paying earnings of a deceased husband to 
his widow regardless of dependency, but paying earnings of a deceased wife to her widower only if he proved 
he was receiving at least half of his support from her); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-45 (1975) 
(invalidating Social Security Act law granting survivors' benefits to both widow and minor children of male 
wage earner but granting such benefits only to minor children and not widower of female wage earner); and 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-16 (1975) (invalidating law setting differential ages of majority for girls 
and boys based on assumption that boys' professional futures require longer preparation than girls'). 
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belief that men are aggressive and thus better fit than women for military-style 
education,45 women are better mothers,46 or boys are more likely than girls to 
drink and drive dangerously,47 then it should follow that government may not 
seek to indoctrinate students with those same sex-based generalizations. 
Legal protection against sex discrimination is centrally concerned with 
stigmatic harms-ideological and cultural ideas even apart from concrete acts 
of denial or exclusion.48 In the context of racial discrimination, too, the 
Supreme Court has long underscored the centrality of stigma as an ingredient 
of the unconstitutionality of policies in areas ranging from education, to juror 
participation, to voting rights.49 Under the race cases, government can no more 
45 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-45 (1996). 
46 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-30 (2003); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380, 389 (1979). The Court's decision in Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001), is not to the contrary. See 
Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. LJ. 835 (2002) (arguing that Nguyen's tolerance of stereotypes about maternal versus paternal ties 
evidences immigration and nationality concerns). 
47 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 2()()"{)4 (1976). 
48 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the 
"stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of 
one's race or sex," such that "whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex 
as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual"); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
625 (1984 ) (defining the "serious social and personal harms" of "discrimination based on archaic and 
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes," which "forces individuals to labor 
under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities" and "thereby both deprive[] 
persons of their individual dignity and den[y] society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, 
and cultural life"); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (determining that "the right to equal 
treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not coextensive with any substantive rights to the benefits denied 
the party discriminated against," but that "discrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic 
notions' or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as 'innately inferior' and therefore as less worthy 
participants in the political community, ... can cause serious noneconomic injuries to those persons who are 
personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group"); Mary Anne 
Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 765, 785-86 (2002) (opining that 
it would be constitutionally problematic for a governmental entity to make a pronouncement of sex inequality 
even if it were "unmoored from direct, binding connection to policy," such as by declaring "Welcome to Cobb 
County, Where a Woman's Place Is in the Home"); see also David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 
90 CAL. L. REv. 997, 1009 (2002) (describing gender as a form of ideology that government is obligated to 
disestablish by "neither endors[ing] nor disapprov(ing] gender beliefs"). 
49 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980, 985 (1996) (declaring that "[o]ur Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and 
reinforcement of racial stereotypes" and condemning as "constitutional harm" the racially stereotyping 
"message" communicated by "the bizarre shape and noncompactness demonstrated by the districts here"); City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (observing that "[c]lassifications based on race 
carry a danger of stigmatic harm" and "may only reinforce common stereotypes"); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 609 (1982) ("state interest in securing residents from the 
harmful effects of discrimination" extends "beyond mere physical interests to economic and commercial 
interests" to encompass "political, social, and moral damage"); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, 
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proclaim white supremacy than it can act on racist views to deny concrete 
opportunities; a similar bar should be recognized against official sex 
stereotyping. 
To some extent, the terms of judicial intervention to remedy stigmatic harm 
have been analyzed through the standing doctrine, where standing to challenge 
policies that communicate racial inferiority has been broadly construed. 50 
Even a lack of standing to challenge a stereotyping harm in court would not, 
however, vitiate the unconstitutionality of government espousing sex-biased 
views on which it is prohibited from acting.51 In the final analysis, equality 
norms should require the adoption of a counter-stereotyping approach to sex 
education even if those norms are not always judicially enforceable. 
The equal protection critique of abstinence-only curricula is strengthened 
and rendered more amenable to judicial resolution by the fact that sex 
education classes are designed not only to expose students to ideas, but also to 
shape student behavior. Obligatory education permeated with discriminatory 
content alone raises serious constitutional concerns.52 But the conduct-shaping 
purpose of sex education curricula makes them vulnerable to equal protection 
challenge even if communicating retrogressive sex roles in traditional 
academic classes might not be. 
One still might object substantively that it is idealistic blindness to apply 
antistereotyping principles to sex education. Whether or not the fear of sexual 
danger so present in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma supported the 
sex-specific statute in that case, sex can indeed be dangerous, and its potential 
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 803, 865 & n. 314 (2004) (concluding that "[i]n the yeats 
since the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the Court has plainly concluded that the harms imposed by 
racial stigma lie at the core of the problems of inequality the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
address"); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 431,444 ("Racism is both 100% speech and 100% conduct. Discriminatory conduct is not racist 
unless it also conveys the message of white supremacy-unless it is interpreted within the culture to advance 
the structure and ideology of white supremacy."). 
50 See, e.g., Mathews, 465 U.S. at 738-40 (stigmatic, noneconomic injury sufficed to support standing); 
Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) 
(expressly unequal, race-based policy constitutes injury-in-fact for standing purposes, even without denial of a 
concrete benefit). 
51 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217-21 (1978). 
52 The Court in Brown observed that education "is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). A decisive part of what made denial of 
access to integrated schools so harmful in Brown was the intangible but culturally very real message of racial 
inferiority. Id. at 494-95. 
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~arms are deeply gendered. The risks of unwanted pregnancy, disease, sexual 
exploitation, and rape do fall disproportionately on women. The instinct to 
warn young women against male predation does not strike all parents as 
necessarily wrong. It has been powerfully argued, most notably by Catherine 
MacKinnon, that sex and sexuality are central to the politics of women's 
subordination.53 Experience and theory thus have taught us that sex equality 
law must be responsive to the needs of women faced with many forms of 
current, real, gendered harms that are relevant to sex education curricula. 
Even as it accounts for real sex characteristics and sexual harms, however, 
the law of sex equality is also aspirational, seeking to promote equality in part 
by treating us as the equals that we are.54 Those dual responsive and 
aspirational aspects of equal protection are especially highlighted by the sex 
education example. Because young people are involved, our desire to equip 
them to fend off real harms in a gender-scarred world is intensified, even while 
we pin ambitious hopes on them to exemplify egalitarian ideals. Properly 
understood, equal protection is indeed idealistic, but it need not be blindly so. 
Egalitarian sex education should recognize the realities of sex-based 
subordination and harm even while it strongly counters sex-based stereotypes 
and double standards. It should acknowledge and oppose male-on-female 
aggression and the larger system of gender hierarchy that such aggression 
exemplifies and sustains. It should also, however, recognize that boys and 
men, too, are frequently harmed by sexual aggression, and that girls and 
women can be the moving force behind irresponsible or otherwise harmful 
sex. 55 And it should always--especially as applied to young people--express 
hope that old patterns will change. 
53 See. e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 9; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY (2001). 
54 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148~9 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that 
"[ w]e know that like race, gender matters" and that "one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in 
certain cases a [juror's] gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case," but 
nonetheless insisting that equal protection forbids sex-based generalizations in juror selection as "a statement 
about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact"); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 
(\ 984) (acknowledging that "it would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist" 
and that "[t]here is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of 
pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin," but 
nonetheless concluding that "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict" are not 
"permissible considerations" for custody placement). 
55 Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,44 (2004) (noting that "queer 
theorists [cannot] seriously deny the existence and pervasiveness of sexual violation: of women by men, men 
by men, women by women, and sometimes, by women of men"); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (recognizing that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition covers male-on-male sexual 
harassment); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 488 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
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Teaching sex stereotypes may actually leave students more vulnerable. 
Reflexive, blanket assumptions about where we will find sexual aggression or 
vulnerability may obscure where real dangers lie. Painting all males with the 
brush of sexual brutishness both naturalizes the wrong done by the rapist and 
obscures the good of the non-aggressor. Sex-based double standards also 
encourage female sexual passivity, lack of agency, and a culture of sexual 
objectification of women that neither protects women from unwanted sex nor 
advances their ability to find fulfillment in wanted sex. 56 The teaching of 
female passivity encourages women not only to deny their own desires, but 
also to deny their lack of desire. Consensual but unwanted sex is not rape, but 
can be harmful to those who submit to it. 57 The current and future well-being 
of our children is better served by factually informative, counter-stereotyping 
sex education, which emphasizes equal concern for the emotional and physical 
vulnerability of males and females, equal valuation of each person's pleasure 
and fulfillment, and an ethic of equal responsibility on the part of both sexes 
for self and others. 
Sex education must contend with a legacy of official rationalizations for 
inequality in terms of "natural" sex differences. The vast web of sex-based 
hierarchy has been spun off of a kernel of anatomical sex difference. We once 
accepted educational exclusions premised on fears that women's reproductive 
organs would be harmed by academic exertion,58 employment exclusions 
claimed necessary to protect women's chastity,59 and exclusions from political 
life defended in terms of fears that women mixing in public meetings with men 
would lead to illegitimate offspring or other grim effects.6o Against that 
dissenting) (critiquing California statute's failure to cover mature woman's seduction of "young and naIve" 
boys); Kim Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of Sexual Abuse, 88 MARQ, L 
REV. 751, 786-87 (2005) (acknowledging the reality, however rare, of female-on-male sexual abuse). 
56 See Fine, supra note 24, at 42 (advocating that public education include a discourse of female sexual 
desire and noting that, currently, "[p]ublic education's concern for the female victim is revealed as deceptively 
thin when real victims are discredited, and when nonvictimizing pleasures are silenced"). 
57 See Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX 263--{58 (Alan Soble ed., 
3d ed. 1997). 
58 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 & n.9 (1996); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 
(1975); EDWARD CLARKE, SEX AND EDUCATION: OR A FAIR CHANCE FOR GIRLS (1873) (offering dire 
predictions of results of educating girls and asserting that women developed problems with their "female 
organs" as a result of their failures to accept their limitations). 
59 E.g., Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). 
60 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 n.5 (noting concern about "depravation of morals and ambiguity of issue," 
articulated as justification to keep women out of public meetings) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5 1816), in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45, 46, n.1 (Paul L Ford ed., 
1899». 
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decidedly nonneutral historical backdrop, government's obligation to maintain 
neutrality with respect to gender roles might include an affirmative obligation 
on the part of public school curricula and teachers not only to refrain from 
propagating, but also to contradict, persistent sex-role stereotypes and double 
standards. 
Sex education can be egalitarian without ignoring the realities of sex 
inequality. Teaching about sex-based discrimination, identifying historical 
patterns, and observing general trends is not the same thing as endorsing them. 
For equal protection purposes, as under the religion clauses, the constitutional 
line should be drawn between descriptive teaching, and prescriptive or 
normative advocacy of sexual double standards.6l The line between 
description and advocacy may not always be easy to draw in practice because a 
teacher's discussion of the status quo can readily be taken as an affirmation of 
it. Mere descriptions of "the way most women (or men) are" may be 
statistically correct and descriptively accurate, but they are also at the heart of 
sex discrimination. The surest way to safeguard against the elision of 
descriptive and normative views of sex difference is to point it out. 
To teach about sex, gender, and sexuality in a way that counters rather than 
reinforces stereotypes, egalitarian sex education curricula should explain what 
is wrong with sex-based generalizations when so much of what we see and 
know seems to confirm them. Antistereotyping doctrine acknowledges that 
there are many observable, statistically "real" differences between women and 
men--differences on points like aggressiveness, confidence, sensitivity, or 
cooperativeness. It also acknowledges the reality that males and females may 
face significantly different social consequences from the same behaviors, like 
chastity or promiscuity. Antistereotyping law nonetheless resists sex-based 
generalizations for good reasons, which teachers can convey.62 
Egalitarian sex education should communicate relevant ethics and concerns 
to both sexes. It should affirm the value of sexual pleasure for females as well 
61 See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 607 (1987) (striking down state law requiring 
teaching of creationism, but acknowledging that "[c]ourses in comparative religion of course are customary 
and constitutionally appropriate" and that "a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to 
understand many historical as well as contemporary events"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking 
down law authorizing moment of silence for prayer in school); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87 
(1971) (permitting public aid to colleges that "covered a range of human religious experiences and are not 
limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion," which "made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to 
proselytize"). 
62 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
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as males, and the vulnerability of males as well as females to emotional and 
physical harm. It should alert girls as well as boys that the power of sexual 
desire can test our rationality and emphasize that we are all nonetheless 
obligated-and are expected to learn-to exercise self-control. Egalitarian sex 
education should teach students of both sexes that parenthood imposes 
enormous responsibilities, which should be shared by both women and men. 
Evenhanded teaching about abstinence and contraception would stress that 
those behaviors are the responsibility of both sexes. Those messages can be 
taught consistently with a focus in sex education on preventing harm to youth 
by, for example, discouraging teens of both sexes from having sex; any 
abstinence message must, however, eschew sex-based double standards. 63 
In sum, retrogressive gender ideology, prescribing chastity and maternity 
for women while assuming lustfulness and autonomy for men, is at the heart of 
today's abstinence-only education movement. In that regard, the abstinence-
only approach conflicts with the substantive norms of both equal protection 
and reproductive justice. Egalitarian sex education, in contrast, uses the 
teachings of constitutional antistereotyping doctrine to promote gender 
equality in a context in which it has important ramifications for avoiding 
unwanted pregnancies, promoting procreative responsibility, and enhancing the 
sexual agency and sex equality that reproductive rights are about. Boys will be 
less likely to engage in unwelcome and irresponsible sex or to spawn unwanted 
offspring if they are affirmatively taught to respect girls as equals, discouraged 
from linking their masculinity and power to sexual conquest, and taught to be 
caregivers responsible for and not threatened by intimate connection with 
children. Girls will be less likely to be victimized by unwanted sex or to face 
unintended pregnancy if their desire or its lack is deemed to be as important as 
men's, they feel empowered to act as sexual agents, and they have 
opportunities beyond motherhood to which they realistically can aspire. 
Counter-stereotyping sex education thus advances the interconnected goals of 
reproductive freedom and sex equality. 
63 I do not here take a position on the abstinence message itself, beyond arguing that it must not be 
embedded with sexual stereotypes or discriminatorily applied to women and not men. Inequality, not sex, is 
the harm I am addressing. Just as some believe that abstinence is best, other families or communities condone 
responsible sexual activity among older teens. It thus seems plausible that some schools or school boards 
might elect not particularly to promote abstinence, but to emphasize sexual safety and responsibility instead. 
Ruth Colker argues, for example, that it is not teen sex or even teenage parenthood as such that is individually 
and socially harmful, but that teenage pregnancy "becomes problematic because of the inadequate social 
resources devoted to facilitating the pregnancy" and the ensuing family's well-being. Ruth Colker, An Equal 
Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender. Race. Age. and Class, 199 I DUKE 
L.J. 324, 329-30; see also infra Part III. 
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II. CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY: THE EQUALITY RIGHT TO A VOID OR POSTPONE 
MOTHERHOOD 
Sex equality law also has a vital role to play in assuring that women and 
men have access to reliable and affordable birth control. For both supporters 
and opponents of abortion rights, avoidance of unwanted pregnancy is 
preferable to termination of pregnancy through abortion. Compared to 
abortion, contraception is generally safer, easier on women's bodies, more 
private,64 less expensive, and draws fewer religious or moral objections. The 
antiabortion movement decries abortion as if it were a mere "convenience" for 
people too irresponsible to plan ahead, and it finds licentiousness in the notion 
of "abortion on demand.,,65 Abortion should not be used as just another form 
of contraception, they argue. The implication is that people unwilling to parent 
a child or offer it for adoption should use birth control.66 
Despite widespread support for contraceptive use, our public policy and 
law regarding contraceptive equity contributes to the failures of millions of 
sexually active people to use contraception when they do not want children.67 
64 Abortion is protected by what is often characterized as a privacy right, but as a practical matter, the 
need to involve medical personnel and often one's parents in an abortion, and to have the procedure done in a 
clinic or hospital, make it a much less private procedure than a woman's use in her own home of birth control 
drugs or devices, like pills or a diaphragm. 
65 See. e.g., Robert H. Bork, Inconvenient Lives, 68 FIRST THINGS 9, 11-I3 (1996). 
66 Some opponents of abortion believe that nonprocreative sex (and thus contraception) is acceptable 
only within marriage. Others believe that intercourse should be reserved for reproduction alone, and oppose 
contraception even within marriage on grounds that interference with a fertilized egg, as by the IUD or the 
birth control pill, ends a human life. See, e.g., Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on 
the Regulation of Birth (July 25, 1968), in 13 THE POPE SPEAKS 329-46 (1969). Nonetheless, far fewer people 
object to contraception than oppose abortion; I do not here engage the views of contraception opponents, but 
take as a starting point that the right to use contraception is constitutionally protected, whether the person 
seeking to use it is married or single, mature or young. See generally Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 
678,693,697-99 (1977) (contraceptive rights of persons under age 16); Eisenstadt V. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453-55 (1972) (contraceptive rights of unmarrieds); Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) 
(articulating contraceptive rights of married persons). In recognizing the due process right to gay sex in 
Lawrence V. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003), the Supreme Court also reaffirmed the value of and 
constitutional right to nonprocreative sex more generally. As noted above, it may be appropriate for public 
school teachers in sex education courses to encourage youth to abstain from sex. Government cannot 
constitutionally require or assume, however, that adults will abstain from sex, including intercourse, with other 
consenting adults, nor can it penalize those who fail to abstain. 
67 "More than 40 years after the contraceptive revolution began with the approval of the contraceptive 
pill, the United States lags far behind its social and economic counterparts when it comes to effectively 
reducing the burdens of unintended pregnancy and of sexually transmitted infections (STls) and related 
fertility problems." ALAN GUITMACHER INST., THE UNANISHED REVOLUTION IN CONTRACEPTION: 
CONVENIENCE, CONSUMER ACCESS, AND CHOICE 3 (2003), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2004/09120/ 
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Contraceptive shortfalls, in tum, arise in part from reference to male health 
needs as the baseline for health care and insurance coverage, including 
coverage of contraception.68 Equally meeting women's health needs, whether 
they are the same as men's or distinctive as they often are in the area of 
reproductive health, is a critical aspect of treating women as equal human 
beings. Proponents and opponents of abortion rights alike, if they are 
committed to sex equality, should join forces in supporting full and equal 
access to contraception for women and men. 
The lack of a national requirement that insurance plans cover women's 
contraceptives is emblematic of a much broader failure to make contraceptive 
access a priority to reduce the extremely high numbers of unintended 
pregnancies in the United States. The contraceptive equity issue as it relates to 
health insurance plans is just one facet of a larger set of sex inequalities in the 
area of reproductive health. It presents an opportunity to uncover a partly 
submerged and critically important theoretical rift in our understandings of 
reproductive health and sex equality more generally, and helps point the way to 
more sound approaches to both. 
On one side of the rift is the Court's approach to constitutional equality law 
that refuses to treat discrimination based on pregnancy as sex-based 
discrimination. That theory calls for equality of the sexes only insofar as 
women are nonreproducing persons. According to that theory, insofar as 
women and men are not similarly situated with respect to pregnancy, they need 
not be treated equally. 
This theory has its most prominent legal statement in Geduldig v. Aiello,69 
which held that denial of disability benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities 
while providing coverage for other, similarly disabling conditions did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.7o Geduldig reasoned that the challenged 
disability policy discriminated, not between women and men, but between 
pregnant and nonpregnant persons (the latter group including both females and 
males).71 The Court thus eschewed the heightened scrutiny required of sex-
based distinctions in favor of rational-basis review and upheld the exclusion 
based on the state's interest in fiscal integrity. In General Electric Co. v. 
UnfinRevlnContra.pdf. Opposition by social conservatives has decreased funding for contraceptive health 
and, consequently, women's access to contraceptives. Id. at 9. 
68 See Colker, supra note 63, at 344--46 (noting that the baseline also is implicitly white and wealthy). 
69 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
70 Id. at 494-95. 
71 Id. at 496 n.20. 
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Gilbert,n the Court promptly extended that constitutional theory of equality to 
its interpretation of Title VII.73 
A second theory, reflected in federal statutory equality mandates, views sex 
equality as also applicable to reproducing persons. It understands 
discrimination based on pregnancy or other aspects of women's reproductive 
capacity as discrimination based on sex, requiring that women's pregnancy or 
contraceptive needs be treated as favorably as other, analogous conditions that 
also affect men. This view of sex equality understands that pregnancy and 
related conditions are often used as proxies for femaleness and excuses for sex 
discrimination. It thus carefully scrutinizes distinctions based on reproductive 
capacity or role as likely sites of unequal treatment. 
This second theory is exemplified by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA), a 1978 amendment to Title VII that overruled Gilbert to define 
discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions"-such as the ability to become pregnant-as prohibited sex 
discrimination.74 As a practical matter, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
rendered Geduldig's reasoning all but a dead letter (at least in the employment 
context) for thirty years.75 A law that targets women's distinctive reproductive 
capacity or conduct is, under Title VII, a law aimed at women because of their 
sex. It is therefore unlawful to provide unequal employment opportunities or 
fringe benefits to women and men, even when the difference is based on 
demonstrated sex distinctions like pregnancy or the capacity to become 
pregnant. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the difference in 
women's reproductive anatomy does not justify exclusion of fertile women 
from jobs involving lead exposure with potential harmful consequences to 
fertility or fetal development.76 
The second theory has found straightforward application in the context of 
contraceptive access. Health insurance plans that deny contraceptive coverage 
usually cover all other drugs or devices, even those not required for an illness 
72 429 U.s. 125 (1976). 
73 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
74 § 2000e(k) (2000). 
75 Geduldig has not been wholly devoid of doctrinal force. For example, the Court in Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,271-73 (1993), invoked Geduldig in refusing to apply to abortion clinic 
blockades a federal law prohibiting conspiracies motivated by "class animus" (e.g., race, sex). See 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1985(3). The blockades were not targeted at women based on sex, the Court reasoned, because women were 
not only among those seeking abortions, but also among those objecting. Bray, 506 U.S. at 270. 
76 United Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,200 (1991). 
HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 966 2006-2007
966 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56 
or abnonnal condition. They provide coverage for purely preventative care 
(e.g., vaccinations, medications to maintain healthy blood pressure or 
cholesterol level), for drugs and devices needed due to voluntary "lifestyle 
choices" (e.g., weight-loss drugs and drugs and devices relating to alcohol 
abuse or smoking cessation), and even drugs, like Viagra, that facilitate 
intercourse for men. Under these plans, anyone who needs Anabuse to help 
with a drinking problem, or Lipitor to reduce cholesterol levels, or Viagra to 
enhance sexual performance, is entitled to see a doctor and have medication 
prescribed. However, a woman who wants contraception so that she can enjoy 
sex and prevent pregnancy must pay for a doctor visit to obtain a prescription, 
and then she must pay for the contraception itself.77 
Such policies' contraceptive exclusion does not directly affect covered men 
because condoms require no prescription or doctor's fitting. Subscribers pay 
out of pocket for condoms just as members of both sexes pay for any other 
over-the-counter drug or device. Condoms are inexpensive and widely 
available nationwide, around the clock, in urban and rural areas alike. They 
can be picked up at convenience stores, drugstores, grocers, vending machines 
in men's restrooms, and even from bowls at clinics, parties, and clubs. 
Contraceptives used by women-including birth control pills, intrauterine 
devices, diaphragms, Implanon (subcutaneous implants), and emergency 
contraceptive pills for young women-require a doctor's prescription, yet are 
carved out for explicit exclusion from some otherwise comprehensive 
prescription benefit plans.78 
77 A recent study reports that 46% of women pay $15 for each month's supply of oral contraceptives, and 
that out-of-pocket expenses and dispensing restrictions inhibit access to contraception. See ALAN 
GUTIMACHER INST., supra note 67, at 9. The average cost of a physician's visit for contraceptive prescription 
is approximately $85, and women taking the pill (the method used by over 30% of women using any method 
of birth control) typically visit their doctors once a year for prescription refills. Holly Mead, Making Birth 
Control More Accessible to Women: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Over-the-Counter Oral Contraceptives, 
BRIEFING PAPER (Inst. for Women's Policy Research, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2001, at 3, 
http://www.iwpr.org!pdf/otc0201.pdf. 14.4% of women in the United States lack health insurance altogether 
(including Medicaid) and thus lack contraceptive as well as other routine health care coverage. HEALTH RES. 
& SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WOMEN'S HEALTH USA 2005, at 64 (2005), 
http://mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa_051_pdf/whusa2005.pdf. These women--disproportionately poor, young, 
minority and immigrant-must also pay the out-of pocket charges for contraceptive health care or find a clinic 
that offers subsidized contraceptive health services. See generally ALAN GUTIMACHER INST., FuLFILLING THE 
PROMISE: PUBLIC POLICY AND U.S. FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS 16 (2000), http://www.guttmacher.org!pubsl 
fulfill.pdf. 
78 After this Symposium was held in the spring of 2006, the FDA approved emergency contraception for 
over-the-counter sales to adults. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Over-the-Counter 
Access for Plan B for Women 18 and Older Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under (Aug. 24, 
2006), http://www.fda.govlbbs/topicsINEWS/2006INEWOI436.html. Approval of over-the-counter sales of 
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Failure of otherwise comprehensive insurance plans to cover prescription 
contraceptives is a significant form of sex discrimination. Such discrimination 
has become especially vivid in light of the development and widespread 
prescription of Viagra for men. Otherwise-comprehensive prescription benefit 
plans treat male enjoyment of sex with the aid of Viagra (without the condition 
that it be for procreation) as a shared concern warranting insurance coverage, 
while treating women's ability to enjoy sex without risk of unwanted 
pregnancy as a personal issue to be addressed out of the woman's own 
pocketbook. (Condom use, needless to say, does not adequately protect 
women as it is not wholly within their control). Those policies, like the 
abstinence-only curricula discussed in Part I, track some of the most ingrained 
sex stereotypes---defining men in terms of potency, sexuality and otherwise, 
and women in terms of motherhood, even when they would not choose it.79 
In recognition of the inequity of contraceptive exclusions, more than 
twenty states have enacted contraceptive equity laws, reinforcing and 
expanding on the PDA's approach, specifically requiring health insurance 
plans regulated by state law to cover contraception. 80 Where state law does 
not require such coverage, sex discrimination lawsuits have established an 
entitlement to contraceptive equity under Title VII, as a handful of courts and 
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have held that 
emergency contraception was a positive development in terms of the equality and reproductive rights argument 
advanced here. Emergency contraception (nonprescription) is now more readily available to adult women than 
contraception used before and during intercourse, such as the pill, diaphragm, or IUD (which still require 
prescriptions). 
79 To the extent that exclusion of contraception from otherwise comprehensive health plans implies that 
contraception is something other than a health need, the implication is flatly counterfactual. Childbearing may 
be natural, healthy, and, ideally, joyful, but so, for example, are maturation and ageing, yet neither comes 
without health implications. There is no question that before the widespread availability of contraception, the 
bearing of large numbers of children was an enormous burden on women's health and was a leading cause of 
maternal death. Achievemellts in Public Health, 1900-1999: Healthier Mothers and Babies, 48 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 849 (1999). Even now, when the average number of children per woman in the 
United States hovers around 2.1 births per woman, a woman who uses contraceptives is exposed to less health 
risk than a woman who undergoes childbirth. See, JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT 
POPULATION REPORTS: FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2004, at I (2005), http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf; CICELY MARSON & JOHN CLELAND, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE EFFECTS OF 
CONTRACEPTION ON OBSTETRIC OUTCOMES 5 (2004), http://www.who.intlreproductive-healthlpublications/ 
2004/effects_contraception/text.pdf; Ushma D. Upadhyay & Bryant Robey, Why Family Planning Matters, 
POPULATION REP., July 1999, at I, available at http://www.infoforhealth.org!pr/j49/j49.pdf. 
80 ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF JANUARY I, 2006, 
http://www.guttmacher.org!statecenterlspibs/spib_ICC.pdf (reporting that 26 states require that insurers 
covering prescriptions drugs in general also cover the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and 
devices); NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LAWS IN YOUR STATE: KNow YOUR RIGHTS-
USE YOUR RIGHTS I (2003), http://www.nw1c.org!pdf/concovstateguide2003.pdf. 
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employers that offer otherwise comprehensive insurance coverage of drugs and 
devices must also cover birth control.81 Just as women cannot be discharged or 
otherwise disadvantaged at work because they use (or do not use) 
contraceptives, they cannot be denied coverage of contraceptives under an 
employer-sponsored health plan that provides benefits for comparable drugs 
and devices.82 The PDA, the EEOC's decision explained, was enacted to 
"ensure that women would not be disadvantaged in the workplace either 
because of their pregnancies or because of their ability to have children.,,83 
The PDA approach is thus the prevalent one, and most insured women in the 
United States do have contraceptive coverage.84 
Geduldig's narrower understanding of sex discrimination is nonetheless a 
crack in the foundation of contemporary equality law. Geduldig's destructive 
potential is hinted at by a recent contraceptive equity case, Cummins v. 
Illinois. 85 The district court in Cummins broke from the trend in favor of 
contraceptive equity to sustain Illinois's exclusion of prescription 
contraception against a sex discrimination challenge.86 Although Title VII 
would seem to forbid that result, the judge in Cummins relied on a version of 
Geduldig's reasoning: "non-surgical control of fertility is excluded equally to 
81 See, e.g., Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 984 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that 
"as prescription contraceptives are only available to women, the exclusion is not gender neutral because it only 
burdens female employees"); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co .. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(requiring contraceptive coverage under Title VII, noting that "mere facial parity of coverage does not excuse 
or justify an exclusion which carves out benefits that are uniquely designed for women"); U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Decision on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html[hereinafter EEOC Decision] (opining that even 
though the plan at issue did not explicitly distinguish between men and women, prescription contraceptives are 
available only for women and the plan's exclusion of them was thus sex based). As this issue went to press, a 
divided Eighth Circuit panel in In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Lit., 479 F.3d 936 (2007), 
sustained a health plan's exclusion of prescription contraception, reasoning that contraception is not "related 
to" pregnancy within the terms of the PDA, and that its exclusion is not sex discrimination under Title VII 
because the plan equally excludes women's and men's contraception. The decision seems quite clearly wrong, 
as its PDA analysis contravenes that statute's terms and purpose to cover pre-pregnancy reproductive health, 
see Johnson Controls, 449 U.S. at 200, and its Title VII analysis improperly failed to find sex inequality in 
plans not equally comprehensive as to women and men. The decision should add impetus to current efforts to 
enact federal contraceptive equity legislation. 
82 EEOC Decision, supra note 81, at 2. 
83 Id. 
84 ALAN GlITTMACHER INST., FACTS IN BRIEF: CONTRACEPTIVE USE 2 (2006) (reporting that "9 in 10 
employer-based insurance plans cover a full range of contraceptives, which is 3 times the proportion just a 
decade ago"). 
85 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. 111. Aug. 30, 2005), appeal filed, No. 05-3877 (7th Cir.). 
86 In 2003 (effective Jan, 1,2004), Illinois amended its law prospectively to require that insurance plans 
include contraception in otherwise comprehensive plans, 215 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/356z.4 (West 2006), 
but the Cummins class action remains pending on the plaintiffs' monetary claims for lost benefits. 
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both sexes," apparently just as pregnancy disability coverage in Geduldig was 
denied equally to all "pregnant persons.,,87 It did not seem to matter to the 
court that only women suffered the prescription-contraception exclusion, just 
as it did not matter in Geduldig that pregnancy is a condition unique to 
women.88 
As of this wntmg, Cummins is on appeal, and the decision may yet be 
reversed or the case may be settled out of court. The decision nonetheless 
highlights troubling and persistent instability in the law of sex equality. One 
aspect of that instability is the apparent gap between the two theories of sex 
discrimination identified above. If the Constitution demands equality only for 
nonreproducing men and women, can Congress constitutionally require more? 
In doctrinal terms, the instability can be reduced to whether Title VII, as 
amended by the PDA, is "appropriate legislation," implementing constitutional 
equality as the Supreme Court understands it, and thus validly abrogating 
sovereign imrnunity.89 The Supreme Court's federalism cases require a theory 
87 2005 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 42634, at *24. 
88 The Cummins court also reasoned, in a puzzling non sequitur, that because women and men both are 
involved in procreation, denial of birth control to women equally affects both sexes: While it is true that 
"[c]onception is by definition the fertilization of the ovum, which takes place inside a woman's body," the 
court wrote, it is not true that 
[h]ealth plans that deny coverage for contraception, by definition, affect only the health of the 
women . . .. [T]he process clearly requires the participation of both males and females, and, 
critically, the process may therefore be prevented by either the male or the female, each of whom 
is consequently equally affected by the exclusion in this case. 
ld. at **24-25. Although his reasoning is not entirely clear, it seems that Judge Gilbert is suggesting that 
because contraception is a barrier between sperm and ovum, both sexes are equally affected by unavailability 
of female contraception as a method to be used when the couple has sex. To the extent that men prefer the pill 
over condoms, for example, the exclusion equally deprives the male sex partners of female employees of the 
pill as a contracepti ve choice. That view overlooks, however, that it is women, not men, who become 
pregnant, that only female contraceptives can prevent pregnancy without regard to men's willingness to 
cooperate, and that, presumably for those very reasons, female contraceptives are prescribed towomen, not to 
men. If condoms required a prescription and the pill did not, and condoms were excluded from otherwise 
comprehensive health insurance, men might have valid sex discrimination claims just as I believe women do in 
cases like Cummins. They would have such claims even though, as Judge Gilbert's reasoning suggests, 
women, too, have a very strong stake in condom use. Indeed, women's stake in such claims would be 
considerably stronger than that of men in Cummins due to the ability of condoms to shield against sexually 
transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, to which women are disproportionately vulnerable. The other 
sex's stake, however, does not remove the inequality of noncoverage of one sex's contraception. 
89 It is the Supreme Court's federalism revolution that threatens to revive Geduldig as an obstacle to 
women's equality. One of the major lines of Rehnquist Court's federalism cases held that plaintiffs cannot 
obtain damages against nonconsenting states under a federal statute (e.g., Title VII) unless they can 
demonstrate that the statute is a valid congressional implementation of constitutional guarantees. Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1996); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). The 
animating idea is that, under our federalist system, states retain sovereign immunity against damage claims 
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of how the PDA implements the judicial understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause, notwithstanding Geduldig. 
That theory is suggested by the Court's 2003 decision in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, which sustained a damage claim 
against the state under the Family and Medical Leave Act.90 The Court in 
Hibbs specifically noted in dicta that Congress validly abrogated sovereign 
immunity in enacting Title VII, of which the PDA is a part.91 The disparate-
treatment aspects of Title VII are indisputably appropriate legislative 
enforcement of judicially defined equal protection rights, as the substantive 
requirement of Title VII simply tracks the strong constitutional presumption 
against distinctions motivated by or expressly based on sex.92 A classic 
example of unconstitutional sex discrimination that is also pregnancy 
discrimination under the PDA is the failure to hire or promote a woman based 
on the assumption that, because of her sex, she is more likely than an otherwise 
comparable male to leave work once she has children.93 That kind of sex 
stereotyping is at the core of what equal protection forbids. 
except where Congress has outlawed the state conduct as a "congruent and proportional'" way to protect 
constitutional rights. Thus, mere commercial legislation pursuant to Congress's broad Commerce Clause 
power cannot overcome state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52-54. Because the post·Civil 
War Reconstruction Amendments were enacted to provide constitutional protection against state 
discrimination, however, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly confers enforcement power on 
Congress, legislation that effectuates equal protection rights may trump state sovereign immunity. The 
sovereign immunity defense was not properly raised in Cummins. See Brief for the Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Tana Cummins at 21 n.5, Cummins v. Illinois, No. 05-3877 (7th 
Cir. Apr. 3, 2006). But whether there or in other similar cases the issue will be whether Title VII as amended 
by the PDA is valid as an implementation of the equal protection guarantee against sex discrimination, even 
though the Court in Geduldig held that denial of benefits to "pregnant persons" is not sex discrimination. See 
id. at 27; Brief for Appellant at 36-40, Cummins, No. 05-3877. There is room under Section 5 for Congress to 
legislate more broadly than a court would rule under Geduldig. The Court has repeatedly insisted that 
"[I]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutionaL" Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 518; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,518 (2004); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 
648-49 (1966). Nonetheless, several important antidiscrimination measures have fallen under the Supreme 
Court's Section 5 sword, including provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (see United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000»; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000»; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (see Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 358 (2001». 
90 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
91 /d. at 727 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), as having so held). 
92 See United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 878 (2006) (concluding that "no one doubts that § 5 
grants Congress the power to ... creat[e] private remedies against the States for actual violations of 
[constitutional] provisions'"). 
93 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-32. 
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To the extent that Title VII exceeds the judicially enforced equal protection 
norm by forbidding policies with only pregnancy-related disparate impact,94 
Title vn seems also to fall within the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5 
power as an appropriate legislative way to prevent and remedy unconstitutional 
discrimination.95 Examples of disparate-impact sex discrimination relating to 
pregnancy would be policies depriving employees of seniority on return from 
pregnancy disability leave96 or providing no leave to employees of either sex 
for conditions like maternity disability or similarly temporary disabling 
conditions.97 Statutory disparate-impact standards can be justified under 
Section 5 even though the Court has declined to recognize disparate-impact 
claims directly under Section I of the Equal Protection Clause.98 
Authorization of disparate-impact claims specifically relating to 
"pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" should be easier to 
justify as "appropriate" Fourteenth Amendment legislation than Title VII's 
authorization of disparate-impact sex discrimination claims more generally.99 
Discrimination relating to women's reproductive role is at the heart of sex 
inequality. Much of that discrimination-such as employers' bias against 
women based on assumptions that women will become pregnant and that those 
who do will be less able or reliable workers-is unconstitutional even under 
Geduldig. IOO 
94 Personal Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (sex-based disparate impact alone does 
not violate Section I of the Equal Protection Clause). 
95 Disparate impact claims were well established at the time of Fitzpatrick, see Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), and Fitzpatrick does not suggest that it is limited to disparate-treatment 
claims. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455. Hibbs rejected the suggestion that a ban on discriminatory leave policies 
alone would suffice to prevent unconstitutional sex discrimination, explaining that doing so would allow no-
leave policies, which would have the effect of excluding more women than men from the workplace. Hibbs 
thus affirmed the FMLA as a remedy for such de/acto discrimination, or disparate impact. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 
737-38. Lower courts have sustained Title VII's disparate-impact prong against Section 5 challenges. See, 
e.g., Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 
198 F.3d 1305, 1316-24 (II th Cir. 1999). 
96 Nashville Gas Co. v. Salty, 434 U.S. 136,139-40 (1977). 
97 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-38. 
98 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,652-53 (1966). 
99 It remains somewhat unclear the extent to which the constitutionality of a federal law under Section 5 
is subject to piecemeal analysis. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (sustaining Title II of 
Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to claims involving fundamental right of access to courts); id. at 
551 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing "grave doubts" about use of as-applied analysis in Section 5 
context); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1321, 1356-59 (2000) (finding ambiguity in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. 
College Saving Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), as to whether Section 5 challenges are necessarily facial or may be 
as applied). 
100 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730--32. 
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Given the apparent validity under Section 5 of the legislative response to 
Geduldig, the continuing coexistence of the two theories of sex discrimination 
may have little immediate practical consequence. Strategically, perhaps the 
best approach is simply to continue to minimize the significance of Geduldig 
and the desiccated theory of sex discrimination it stands for, and advocate, on a 
piecemeal basis, for additional measures to break down reproduction-related 
sex hierarchies. The Supreme Court in Hibbs has already expressly cabined 
Geduldig, making clear that "where regulation of pregnant women rests on 
sex-role stereotypes, it is sex-based state action within the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause.,,101 If state and federal legislators have enacted and 
will continue to expand protections against reproductive sex discrimination-
like the PDA, the FMLA, paid leave, and childcare support-there is less 
practical need to push to overrule Geduldig. There is also the unlikely but very 
costly risk that the Supreme Court, if given the chance, would reaffirm rather 
than limit or overrule Geduldig. Perhaps we should reconcile ourselves to 
living in Geduldig's shadow. 
Doing so is not, however, without costs. It seems clear that Geduldig is 
wrong. 102 Failure to overturn it helps to foster a broader ambivalence about 
101 Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to Pregnancy 
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1871, 1873 (2006). Siegel explains that Geduldig itself was an 
expressly narrow opinion in a way that Hibbs has since made clear: 
Geduldig holds that "not ... every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-
based classification like those considered in Reed . .. and Frontiero." It leaves open the 
possibility that some legislative classifications concerning pregnancy are sex-based 
classifications like those considered in Reed and Frontiero. And Hibbs provides examples of 
legislative classifications concerning pregnancy (e.g., statutes that grant "maternity" leave and 
"pregnancy disability" leave) that the Court holds are "gender-discriminatory" and rest on 
"the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work." 
Id. at 1891-92 (citing Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731). 
102 The scholarly consensus is strongly critical of Geduldig; indeed, it is difficult to find scholars 
supporting the decision. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 758-59 (2006) (stating 
that "it is hard to imagine a clearer sex-based distinction" than the one at issue in Geduldig); Dawn Johnsen, 
Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 608 
(1992) (noting that Geduldig has "been subjected to harsh criticism and even ridicule for [its) assertion that a 
distinction directly targeting a biological characteristic that only women possess and thus disadvantaging only 
women does not constitute a sex based distinction"); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical 
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 268 (1992) 
(observing that "[t)he Court's equal protection analysis in Geduldig is by now infamous"); Sylvia A. Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 (1984) (reporting that criticism of Geduldig 
became "a cottage industry," and that even the leading defense of the decision acknowledges that the Court's 
failure to treat the state policy as sex based was in error). On the merits, the critics have the better arguments. 
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Low (With Special Reference to Pornography, 
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the meaning and scope of sex equality on core issues relating to the sexes' 
reproductive distinctiveness. Women's reproductive capacity stands at the 
heart of the construction of women's unequal social, political, and economic 
roles, so we cannot hope to achieve sex equality without a theory of equality 
that accounts for pregnancy, childbearing, or related conditions. Even 
assuming the continued vitality of the PDA, Geduldig's coexistence with the 
PDA is a reminder that protection against discrimination based on reproductive 
distinctiveness remains an optional matter of legislative policy that Congress 
could repeal tomorrow, not a bedrock, constitutional protection that all official 
action must respect. 
The contraceptive equity cases also point to a second instability in the law 
of sex equality. Whether we assume that the bar against discrimination based 
on reproductive distinctiveness remains only a statutory guarantee, or that 
Geduldig is narrowed or reversed so that the bar is recognized to have 
constitutional force, there remains some ambiguity about the nature of the 
protection that bar affords. This second instability is less about which kinds of 
adverse conduct should be viewed as based on sex than about the meaning of 
sex discrimination in the context of reproductive capacity. Specifically, is it 
enough to treat men and women the same, without regard to whether the 
particular symmetrical treatment offered fails to permit both sexes to 
participate in society as equals? Or does women's equal liberty depend on 
whether equal treatment assures their ability to control their fertility (through 
benefits like health insurance coverage of contraception)? 
One way of getting at that question is to examine the sex-based harm of 
insurance policies that exclude contraception. Is the discriminatory harm the 
meeting of all male health needs while meeting female needs, minus one? 
That is plainly a large part of it. The courts that have found discrimination in 
Abonion. and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. I, 32 (1992) (arguing that "[a) statute that is explicitly 
addressed to women is of course a form of sex discrimination" and that "[a) statute that involves a defining 
characteristic or a biological correlate of being female should be treated the same way"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1580, 1584 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "[t)he proper comparison in Geduldig 
... was not between pregnant women and all other nonpregnant workers, but between female employees who 
had engaged in reproductive behavior and male workers who had done likewise"); Siegel, supra, at 269-70 
(criticizing Geduldig for "ignor[ing) the fact that the capacity to gestate distinguishes the sexes physically ... 
and socially: Judgments about women's capacity to bear children playa key role in social definitions of gender 
roles and thus in the social logic of 'discrimination based on gender as such"'); see also Mary Becker. 
Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 UNIV. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 88 n.339 
(contending that the exclusion authorized by Geduldig unrealistically "assumes that the worker with a 
pregnancy related disability has some other means of support," when in fact she typically "needs money for 
her own survival and the survival of the new citizen dependent on her"). 
HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 974 2006-2007
974 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56 
contraceptive equity cases point to the disjuncture between comprehensive 
coverage of drugs and devices needed by men, and incomplete coverage of 
drugs and devices needed only (and pervasively) by women. I03 The exclusion 
of "contraception" from a list of covered drugs and devices, when that term 
refers to something exclusively needed by women, equates the exclusion to 
one which expressly says "female contraception is excluded." The latter is 
plainly sex based, and the former (really identical) exclusion is, too. To deny it 
would be akin to saying that heightened equal protection scrutiny is 
inapplicable to a government job announcement saying "candidates with 
breasts need not apply"; the excluded category equates to the category of 
women, while barely avoiding saying so. That is clearly a form of sex 
discrimination, and the contraceptive equity decisions correctly recognized it 
as such. 
But that does not fully capture the sex discrimination at issue here. 
Imagine that men's contraception also required a doctor's prescription and that 
it was equally expensive and inconvenient for men to see their doctors and get 
and fill those prescriptions. If under those circumstances men and women's 
contraception were equally excluded from health insurance coverage, would 
exclusion no longer be a form of sex discrimination? Under the reasoning just 
identified, perhaps it would not be. There may be more, however, to the 
contraceptive equity theory. 
Part of the inequity in the cases also relates to the fact that it is 
contraception, and not some other sex-specific benefit-Viagra, breast 
implants, or even treatment for premenstrual syndrome-that is excluded from 
the insurance plans. It is not just the denial of coverage for a sex-specific drug 
or device that is problematic. The policies are particularly inequitable because 
they refuse to cover medical care that empowers women to control their 
reproductive capacity. The point of the PDA, according to the EEOC, was not 
just to mandate formal equality in the employment and benefits offered to 
103 See, e.g., Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979,984 (E.D. Mo. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa 
Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Potential pregnancy, unlike infertility, is a medical 
condition that is sex-related because only women can become pregnant."); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.O. Wash. 2001) ('The special or increased healthcare needs associated with a 
woman's unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, and on the same terms, as other 
healthcare needs"); EEOC Decision, supra note 81 (Exclusion of contraceptive coverage is sex based because 
"prescription contraceptives are available only for women. . .. As a result, Respondents' explicit refusal to 
offer insurance coverage for them is, by definition, a sex-based exclusion. Because 100 percent of the people 
affected by Respondents' policy are members of the same protected group-here, women-Respondent's 
policy need not specifically refer to that group in order to be facially discriminatory."). 
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women and men, but also to "ensure that women would not be disadvantaged 
in the workplace either because of their pregnancies or because of their ability 
to have children."I04 That theory of equality IS more robust than the bare, 
formal equality discussed above. 
That fuller theory of sex equality is not limited to the concern that the 
insurance plans cover Viagra and not the pill, or that they deny something for 
which only women need a prescription while granting everything for which 
men do. That theory also recognizes as a precondition of equality women's 
need to control their fertility-a need that is not met by equally denying 
contraceptive access to both sexes. For women especially, contraception is 
much more than a health need. The economic and emotional burdens of 
unintended pregnancy and the ensuing abortion or childbirth, fall heavily and 
disproportionately on women. Without access to the means to control and 
limit reproduction, the average woman would bear twelve to fifteen children in 
her lifetime. 105 
A society in which women lack control to plan when they have children is 
one in which women must remain second-class citizens. We already know, 
and the Court recognized in Hibbs, that many employers assume that to be a 
mother is to be a primary caregiver with correspondingly less job commitment 
than a man, who is presumed to be an unencumbered "ideal worker."I06 If 
impaired access to contraceptives hinders women's ability to exercise choice 
about when and whether to have children, it also reinforces broader patterns of 
discrimination against women as a class of presumptive breeders rather than 
reliable breadwinners and citizens. 
Women and men have an equal moral claim (and constitutional right) to 
sexual intimacy, yet contraceptive exclusions suggest that women must pay for 
that right in ways that men need not. The right to engage in nonprocreative 
sex, which the Supreme Court has protected from Griswold v. Connecticut lO7 
through Lawrence v. Texas,108 can only be equally assured to women when 
104 EEOC Decision. supra note 81. 
105 Improving Women's Health: Why Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Matters: Hearings on S. 104 
Before the S. Comm. on Health. Education, Labor and Pensions, I 07th Congo 38 (200 I) (statement of Jennifer 
Erickson, phannacist). The availability of the birth control pill alone accounts for much of the leap in the 
proportion of high-powered professional jobs held by women in the United States (from 5% in 1960 to 25% in 
1998). LUKER, supra note 8, at 75. 
106 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736-37; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICf AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 71-72 (2000). 
107 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
108 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
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they have ready access to safe and effective birth control. Plans that fail to 
provide access to contraception on the same terms as other drugs and devices 
are inconsistent with women's equal liberty. 
In light of maternity's burdens on women, It IS inconsistent with sex 
equality for women to be left vulnerable to impregnation against their will, 
even as a result of otherwise consensual intercourse. Medical technology 
today makes a range of woman-controlled contraceptives feasible and 
relatively inexpensive, and women have come to assume that family planning 
is part of a healthy and responsible life. Under these circumstances, even 
formally equal denial of contraceptive access should be understood as sex 
discrimination. In theoretical terms, the formal-equality approach to 
contraceptive access is incomplete without a cultural feminist skepticism of 
any implicitly male baseline of contraceptive coverage. A fuller understanding 
of equality would require that access extend equally to both sexes. 109 
Women's equal freedom of intimate association and liberty to invest in life 
plans on equal terms with men-plans for education, employment, or family 
that can span years-require that contraception be treated as a routine health 
benefit and not excluded from public or private health insurance coverage. 
Women cannot participate in society, learn, earn, govern, and thrive equally 
without the ability to determine whether and when to become mothers. The 
Court's observation in the lead opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, is relevant here, too: "The ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.,,11O Women's 
ability to prevent unintended pregnancy depends on having access to 
contraception that they can control. 
In sum, although women are, in the narrow sense of Geduldig, differently 
situated from men due to the distinct reproductive capacities of each sex, the 
law of sex equality--constitutional as well as statutory-should prohibit 
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions. Those 
aspects of women's reproductive distinctiveness have historically been a 
touchstone of the sex-based division of labor that so much of our equal 
109 This is the approach to sex equality accomplished by the reconciliation of the California pregnancy 
disability leave provision and Title VB in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra. 479 
U.S. 272, 289-91 (1987). 
110 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined in relevant 
part by Justices Blackmun and Stevens). 
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protection law aims to uproot. Discrimination against women as mothers or 
potential mothers remains a widespread equal protection and reproductive 
freedom problem today, and recognizing equality claims in the reproductive 
health area is one step toward addressing that problem. 
Put differently, equal protection should not stop at rooting out 
discriminatory treatment of similarly situated women and men, but should also 
assure that implicitly male norms of the reproductive role are not unreflectively 
accepted as the measure of equality, thereby disadvantaging most women. 
When a man lacks control of his fertility, he does not typically experience it as 
a (negatively) life-shaping event to the extent that a woman ordinarily finds 
lack of control of hers. However inequitable and objectionable that may be, it 
has long been true and remains so. This argument thus requires not only 
equalizing the sexes' health benefits, but also doing so in a way that takes 
women's reproductive health needs as a benchmark. 
Thus, with respect to reproductive distinctiveness, equality law should 
account for the burdens of bearing children and enduring the pervasive sex-role 
expectations of motherhood. Legal (and technological and cultural) treatment 
of reproductive capacity should permit women and men to participate in 
society as equals. As with sex education policy, treatment of contraceptive 
access should counteract stereotyped views of women as fated passively to 
accept motherhood, like sex, on terms advantageous to men. To that end, full 
and equal reproductive health benefits should be viewed as a requisite of sex 
equality, to enable all of us, women as well as men, to choose rather than be 
consigned to devoting our bodies and lives to the production and nurturance of 
h . III t e next generatIon. 
III. WORK-FAMILY: AN EQUALITY RIGHT TO CARE, WITHOUT THE 
FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY 
Unwanted pregnancy is not the only reason women seek abortions, and 
denial of the right to contraception or abortion is not the only way that 
reproductive justice is denied. People who want children, whether or not they 
initially intended to get pregnant, often realize they cannot responsibly carry a 
III See Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47,61 (1971)(arguing, in 
classical liberal terms, that women, like men, should be left free from co-optation of their bodies for the 
support of others); EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 
(1996) (drawing an extended analogy between pregnancy and physical assault, from which women are entitled 
to defend themselves using deadly force if necessary). 
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pregnancy to term. 112 They may be too poor, immature, or sick to raise a well-
cared-for child; they may realize that raising a child would require them to 
leave school or lose a job needed to assure their own and their child's or 
children's support; or they may face opposition, estrangement, or abuse from a 
parent, spouse, or partner. 113 To the extent that sex discrimination intensifies 
the victimization or relative powerlessness of mothers, it enhances the need for 
abortion. I 14 
Figuring out how to respond to those circumstances in a way that promotes 
both sex equality and the freedom to choose motherhood has been a complex 
and central challenge in both feminist theory and in the controversies over 
abortion rights. Crudely put, in feminist theory, cultural feminists have argued 
that women's equality requires valuing and supporting women where they are 
now-substantially involved in care giving-whereas liberal and dominance 
feminists have focused on efforts to move women to situations that provide 
greater access to the jobs and political power still dominated by men. Abortion 
controversy, too, intensifies over the extent to which the starting point is 
accepting maternity, planned or unplanned, or accepting women's entitlement 
to autonomy and choice about whether to carry or terminate a pregnancy. 
The best responses combine the strengths of the different camps in the 
feminist and abortion debates. An overall work-family agenda should be 
informed by a cultural feminist recentering of social values-for men as well 
as women-toward taking care seriously and providing better public and 
private support for it. Work-family policy should also heed dominance 
feminism's insistence that economic resources, such as access to the paid labor 
market and social welfare benefits, are an indispensable ingredient of women's 
equal empowerment. The best work-family approaches adhere as well to 
liberal feminism's insistence on official sex-neutrality (e.g., expecting care 
from and offering family-friendly benefits to both sexes), and on the potential 
112 See Shauna L. Shames & Joan C. Williams, Mothers' Dreams: Abortion and the High Price of 
Motherhood, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 818,822 (2004). 
113 Id. at 831 (citing Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169,171 (\988)). 
114 See generally id. (arguing that women often seek abortions in order to enable them to be better 
mothers, either to existing or future children); Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: 
A Consideration of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371,381, 390 (\995) (arguing that "abortion is a kind of 
mothering decision"); Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. IS, 23 
(1992). This Article focuses on sex inequality, but racial inequality, too, is a major limiting force for people 
who would want to have children but feel they cannot without plunging themselves and their offspring further 
into poverty. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers' 
Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. \029, \036-37 (2004). 
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and freedom of men and women to defy gender stereotypes (e.g., men 
undertaking the burdens and joys of care). Finally, work-family policy could 
speak to both the "pro-choice" and "pro-life" agendas by, in all these ways, 
offering a genuine choice of parenthood. The long distances yet to be traveled 
in these directions mark the great need to protect reproductive rights; they 
underscore that we must guard not only women's liberty and privacy rights to 
defend women's bodily integrity against unwanted pregnancy, but also 
women's equal protection rights against conscription to childbearing and 
motherhood-conditions that today remain deeply inequitable. 
The Supreme Court has not only tentatively recognized the interplay 
between reproductive rights and sex equality, but also acknowledged the 
particular salience to inequality of women's care-giving roles. The Court in 
Hibbs viewed widespread employment discrimination against women, 
stereotyped as caregivers, as evidence to support policy aimed at the 
reconciliation of work and family obligations. I 15 Hibbs also helped parents 
who are-and are not just stereotyped as-caregivers by sustaining sex-neutral 
family and medical leave as a remedy for sex discrimination. 116 And, as noted 
above, the lead opinion in Casey makes the connection between women's 
ability to participate as equals in society and their ability to control when and 
whether to have children. 117 Casey, like Hibbs, recognizes care giving for 
children as a major, life-shaping responsibility principally fulfilled by women. 
An important next step toward egalitarianism and reproductive freedom in 
work-family policy is to place higher priority on social and economic support 
for caregivers, their dependants, and the caring relationship.118 Whether the 
care is for their own or other people's children, care giving is overwhelmingly 
done by women. If care of children were somehow magically assured, that 
assurance would break the links between women's care for children, women's 
relative economic marginalization in contrast to men, and the reproductive 
115 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003). 
116 [d. at 733-34. 
117 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) Ooint opinion of O'Connor, Souter, 
and Kennedy, J.J., joined in relevant part by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J.). 
118 See Roberts, supra note 114, at 1043-52; EVA FEDER KITTAY, loVE'S LABOR (1999) (theorizing 
supportive social responses to dependency as preconditions of sex equality); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, (1995) 
(arguing that, in light of the centrality of children's dependency and mothers' nurturance, mother-child, rather 
than husband-wife, should be considered the core familial relationship); Robin West, The RighI 10 Care, in 
THE SUBJECf OF CARE 88-114 (Eva Feder Kinay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) (arguing for a legal right to 
give care to dependants without thereby becoming impoverished). 
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disempowerment of people otherwise discouraged from having children. 
There is a large and growing literature on the need for better work-family 
policy in the United States l19 and there appears to be support across the 
political spectrum for many such measures. 120 Affordable child care and 
universal public preschool,121 extended school days,122 paid family and medical 
leave, sick days and family days,123 health care for all,124 good-quality, part-
time, and flex-time jobs with benefits,125 a living wage,126 removal of welfare 
"family caps,,,127 better tax benefits for parents, and a reversal of the trend 
toward longer work weeks l28 each would help to break down barriers to 
reproductive freedom and sex equality. 
119 See. e.g., UNRNISHED WORK: BUILDING EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF WORKING 
FAMILIES (Jody Heymann & Christopher Been eds., 2(05); JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME 
DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER INEQUALITY (2004); JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, 
FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT (2003); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 106. 
120 See generally Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Georgetown University Law Center, Workplace Flexibility 
2010, http://www.law.georgetown.edulworkplaceflexibility201O/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
121 See generally EDWARD ZIGLER ET AL., A VISION FOR UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL EDUCATION (2006); 
SUZANNE W. HELBURN & BARBARA R. BERGMANN, AMERICA'S CHILD CARE PROBLEM (2002). The issues of 
the sex inequalities and reproductive constraints on paid caregivers raise additional issues. Child care workers 
often work long hours for little pay, working during their client families' work hours plus commuting time for 
pay that generally comes out of the client's after-tax income. The client's money and time squeeze is passed 
on in amplified form to the childcare worker. She, in turn, is left with little time to be with her own children, 
and limited funds to pay for their care. The importance of child care work, and the market's inability to assure 
adequate compensation for it, should be recognized with greater public funding for such care. Gornick & 
Meyers, supra note 119, at 234. 
122 See. e.g., GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 119, at 235; Lisa Demidovich, Expanding School Time as a 
Workplace Reform: Why Workplace Reformers Should Get Involved in the Massachusetts Expanded Learning 
Time Initiative (2006) (manuscript on file with author). 
123 GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 119, at 112, 144--45; see, e.g. , California's recent legislation funding 
family and medical leave through the state's unemployment compensation system. California Family Rights 
Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12945.1, 12945.2, 19702.3 (2005); NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WHERE 
FAMILIES MATTER: STATE PROGRESS TOWARD VALUING AMERICA'S FAMILIES (2006), http://www. 
nationalpartnership.org/siteiDocServerlWhereFamiliesMatter2005Report.pdf?docID= I 056. 
124 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights and Women's Reproductive Health, 24 STUD. 
IN FAM. PLAN. 73,74--75,81-82 (1993). 
125 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 119, at 183-84; Vicki Shultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 
1881,1936-37 (2000). 
126 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 125, at 1945-48. 
127 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 114, at 1059-60; Shames & Williams, supra note 112, at 838. See 
generally SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN (2003) (arguing generally against all forms of welfare 
caps). 
128 See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 1-2 
(1991) (arguing that despite the development of labor-saving technology, Americans are working ever-longer 
hours); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 22 
(1989) (studying heterosexual couples with children and concluding that, when housework and childcare are 
taken into account, mothers work a month per year more than fathers); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA 
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Interestingly, pro-life as well as pro-choice advocates have picked up on 
the relationship between reproductive choice and support for family caregivers, 
understanding that if mothers had more ability to participate in society as 
equals, women might feel less need for abortion. Feminists for Life (FFL), a 
nonprofit organization declaring itself in favor of equality for women and 
against abortion, makes some claims that resonate with those of some pro-
choice feminists, and which should be common ground in the reproductive 
rights battles. 129 According to FFL's mission statement, "[N]o woman should 
be forced to choose between pursuing her education and career plans and 
sacrificing her child.,,130 The group describes its aim "to eliminate, through 
practical solutions, the root causes driving girls and women to abortion" by 
advocating "affordable housing and healthcare for new parents, fighting family 
caps in welfare reform, working for expansion of the Violence Against Women 
Act, and seeking better enforcement on child support.,,131 FFL asserts that 
"women deserve better" than abortion, and urges an end to the "lack of 
practical resources and support" that make parenting so unthinkable for many 
women. 132 
Antiabortion and pro-choice feminists, as well as proponents of sex 
equality more generally, should support legal, political, and cultural changes 
that will enable women to bear children without sacrificing their futures. One 
WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 
8-9 (2003) (arguing that two incomes are increasingly needed to support a family so that the loss of one 
income now puts families at greater financial risk than in the past, when middle-class fathers could eam a 
"family wage" and at-home mothers could get jobs to tide the family over economic rough patches). 
129 See, e.g., FFL's Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.feministsforlife.org/FAQ/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2006) (explaining that FFL advocates better social support for mothers and favors greater 
legal restrictions on abortion); Shames & Williams, supra note ll2,at 823 (critiquing, from a pro-choice 
perspective, shortfalls in support for mothering as making abortion more necessary). 
130 FFL's Mission, http://www.feministsforlife.orglwho/aboutus.htm(last visited Nov. 19,2006). 
131 Nina J. Easton, Wife'S Role in Women's Group Now in Focus, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2005, at A9. 
132 Feminists for Life, Jane Sullivan Roberts' Service to Women (2006), http://www.feministsforlife.orgl 
news/jsroberts.htm. Other antiabortion activists recognize the connection between unplanned matemity and 
women's prospects in life, but cynically seek to deny rather than change that reality. Paul Swope argues that 
antiabortion advocates can reach young women more effectively if they depict women rejecting abortion, yet 
thriving economically and remaining in control of their lives. Paul Swope, Abortion: A Failure to 
Communicate, 82 FIRST THINGS 31 (1998). He analyses "extremely successful" antiabortion ads that send "the 
subliminal message" of empowerment by depicting young women who faced unwanted pregnancies yet 
eschewed abortion raking leaves in a nice suburban neighborhood as they send their children off to school or 
out jogging toward clearing skies. ld. Those images of middle or upper-middle class, married life with 
resources, leisure, and empowerment do not represent the facts for most young, single mothers. See, e.g., 
HAYS, supra note 127, at 179-8\. The ads Swope admires cynically underplay the connection between 
reproductive control and women's life circumstances. They invert the reasoning of Casey to suggest that 
maternity does not in fact intensify sex inequality and thus can be restricted consistent with women's rights. 
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need not agree with FFL's claim that abortion is "never a solution" to the 
"problems faced by women,,133 to see that FFL has it right in linking feminism, 
reproductive freedom, and social support for care giving. The more society 
supports pregnant women and parents in meeting their care-giving duties, the 
more likely women will feel free to choose childbirth without fear of falling 
out of the ranks of society's equals. The potential for agreement about 
enhanced support for care giving among constituencies with widely divergent 
. f b . .. 134 vIews 0 a ortlOn seems prorrusmg. 
Social support for care giving implicates the workplace, welfare policy, and 
the organization of the family. In addition to being the primary family 
caregiver, most mothers-even those with very young children-work in the 
paid labor force, and the majority of them work full time. Joan Williams's 
pioneering work has argued that the workplace nonetheless remains designed 
around the model of an "ideal worker" who is implicitly male-a worker who, 
if he has children, is assumed to have a wife at home to care for them so that he 
comes to work unencumbered by family care obligations. Many standard 
features of the contemporary workplace date from a period of legally enforced, 
sex-based separate spheres, and have a disproportionate adverse impact on 
women. For example, workplace norms that insist on long, inflexible work 
hours, put a premium on "face time" or require routine travel are considered to 
be sex neutral. They are, however, biased against workers-disproportionately 
women-who also fulfill dependant care obligations. They are also 
increasingly ill-suited to contemporary reality in which parents of both sexes 
work, and fewer working parents of either sex have a homemaker spouse to 
free them from family care responsibilities. 135 People on all sides of the 
abortion debate who are committed to sex equality should support the idea of 
making work and family more readily reconcilable. 
Work-family reforms aimed at alleviating gender bias, however, also create 
risks of intensifying it in a different form. Employers already see women as 
mothers or potential mothers with family care obligations and discriminate 
133 Serrin M. Foster, Feminists for Life of America, Women Deserve Better than Abortion (2004), 
http://www.feministsforlife.org!news/wdb%20smf.htm. FFL seems to deny that the interests of women and 
fetuses do sometimes conflict and that its support for outlawing abortion denies women's moral agency. See 
Katha Pollitt, Feminists/or (Fetal) Life, NATION, Aug. 29, 2005, at 13. 
134 See, e.g., Reducing the Need/or Abonion and Supporting Parents Act, H.R. 6067, I09th Congo (H.R., 
Sept. 13,2006). H.R. 6067 is a bipartisan bill proposing, inter alia, support for new parents as a way to reduce 
the need for abortion. THIRD WAY CULTURE PROJECT, REDUCING THE NEED FOR ABORTION AND SUPPORTING 
PARENTS ACT: A SUMMARY I (2006), http://www.third-way.com/data/productifile/60/Act_Summary_final.pdf. 
135 See WILLIAMS, supra note 106. 
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against them on the assumption that they do or will fall short of the ideal 
worker norm. 136 That kind of discrimination could worsen if employers 
expanded support for care in the ways just described, and if most of the 
employees who took advantage of the policies were women. If measures like 
paid family leave make employers view women in general as costlier, more 
cumbersome employees than men, work-family policies designed to help 
working parents will boomerang against working women. 
That is one reason why the cultural feminist emphasis on supporting care 
and other "feminine" values and activities in which women have found 
fulfillment and happiness is not enough by itself to lead to sex equality; it 
needs to join liberal and dominance feminist strategies for equalizing women's 
power and choices in traditionally male-dominated and defined spheres like the 
workplace. 137 Some of the boomerang effect of generous work-family policy 
might be avoided by government subsidization of family-friendly employment 
policies; if the 'government foots the bill, employer incentives to discriminate 
against women to avoid costly work-family accommodations are blunted. But 
social cost spreading alone does not remedy the whole problem. 
Not only should family-friendly work opportunities be offered on a sex-
neutral basis, but men, too, should be encouraged to take advantage of them. 138 
Sex-role stereotyping is fed by strongly gendered patterns of group behavior, 
so that if employers see more women nurturing and more men running things, 
they will continue to associate femaleness with nurturance and maleness with 
leadership and to discriminate accordingly.139 Sex-based disparate treatment 
136 See, e.g .• Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,736-37 (2003) (confirming the existence 
of gender discrimination in the workplace based on the stereotype of women as caregivers); WILLIAMS, supra 
note 106, at 250. 
137 Mary Becker takes care to make a point, often lost in oversimplified efforts to distinguish strands of 
feminist thought, that "[r]elational [cultural] feminism does not reject either the equal treatment of similarly-
situated women and men (formal equality's focus) nor more power as it is currently defined (dominance 
feminism's focus)," even as she emphasizes that cultural feminism "has a different focus." Becker, supra note 
23, at 48. 
138 Although men cannot get pregnant, give birth, or nurse, they can do everything else associated with 
care for dependant children. Thus, men can participate in the vast majority of family care work. Analyses of 
sex equality and parenting should start by decoupling all forms of family care which both men and women can 
do from pregnancy disability-the period when birth, and sometimes pregnancy, disables women uniquely 
from engaging in other activities like school or work. 
139 New research on social cognition has confirmed with neurological data that our brains absorb 
stereotypes, which impact our interpersonal and intrapersonal relations. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony 
G. Greenwald, ImpliCit Gender Stereot)ping in Judgmellls of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 
(1995); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scielllijic Foundations, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 954-58 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1512-14 (2005). 
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of women in the workforce will persist as long as employers have reason to 
view women, and not men, as nonideal workers due to women's 
disproportionate burden of family care. 140 
Cultural norms must continue to shift to prompt men to be more involved 
in parenting, and those shifts occur slowly. Our sex-based assumptions are so 
ingrained that they feel natural, and become almost invisible. How routinely 
do employers ask female and not male employment applicants about children 
and childcare plans, without it occurring to them that such questions might 
amount to sex discrimination?141 How many of us in our personal lives have 
responded to news that a heterosexual, working couple is expecting a child by 
inquiring or wondering about when, whether, and on what terms the woman 
will return to work after the baby comes-without likewise wondering about 
the man? We all live in the shadow of earlier generations. When heterosexual 
parents disagree about the fairness of the division of family and household 
care, the woman may feel resentful of her partner for falling short of doing 
fifty percent of the housework and family care, while the man may feel 
virtuous for doing so much more than his own father did. And to the extent 
that parenting requires supportive, nurturing, and empathic traits culturally 
associated with femininity, being observed as an involved father with a core 
caretaking role is bound to feel threatening to a man. 142 While employment 
140 It is also important to employ men in the childcare field. Children who see only women as caregivers 
will inevitably grow up inculcated with stereotypes about sex and care giving. 
141 See WILLIAMS, supra note 106, at 207 (arguing that workplaces designed for the bodies and life 
patterns of men-without allowing time off for childbearing-illegally discriminate based on sex); see also, 
Moms Rising Petition, hnp:llwww.momsrising.orgJPA (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (petition supporting two 
Pennsylvania bills, H.B. 352 and S.B. 440, that would add language to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
making it illegal for employers to ask these kinds of questions, suggesting such behavior is not already illegal). 
142 Becker's illuminating analysis, drawing on the work of sociologist Allan G. Johnson, explains male 
oppression of women as deriving less from men's desire to control women than from men's fear of other men 
and their concomitant drive for archetypal male attributes of control, power, autonomy, rationality, and 
strength. Becker, supra note 23, at 27. On that account, oppression of women is more a side effect than an 
objective of patriarchy. One function of women under patriarchy is to help to define and support the 
masculinity of "their men," in part through contrast: 
Men are men to the extent that they are not women: masculine, independent, invulnerable, tough, 
strong, aggressive, powerful, commanding, in control, rational, and non-emotional. "Real 
women" (that is, middle- or upper-middle-class white women) are dependent, vulnerable, pliant, 
weak, supportive, nurturing, intuitive, emotional, and empathic. 
Id. at 27 (citing ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 35 
(1997)). 
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law can prompt some progress on these issues, the levers of change also need 
to extend to the law and culture governing family life. 143 
Many people assume-whether consciously or not-that even though men 
can nurture children, women like it more and are better at it. They think that it 
is unwise, counterproductive, probably futile, and not a necessary aspect of sex 
equality for men, on average, equally to contribute to family care. There are, 
however, substantial reasons to question those assumptions. As discussed in 
Part I, identification of male and female preferences and characteristics has 
long been bedeviled by the problem of adaptive preferences, making it difficult 
to distinguish what we really want from what legal and cultural role-typing 
have taught us to accept. 144 Substantial new research on gender and the brain 
have been viewed as added support for theories of hard-wired sex differences, 
but the data is complex and conflicting. 145 Moreover, nobody denies the 
substantial overlap between the neurological characteristics of the sexes as 
groups, nor contends that we should necessarily behave the way that we are 
"wired" to act. 146 Plus, even if all or most men were shown to be different in 
relevant respects from all or most women, different kinds of people can be 
very good parents-indeed, the liberty rights of parents to decide how to raise 
their children is founded on that notion. 147 
Over time, men may come to identify more strongly with their parental role 
so that fewer fathers opt out of care, more gay male couples raise children, and 
fewer mothers decide against co-parenting with men. The kinds of patriarchal 
attitudes that tolerate male abandonment of children to their mothers, and that 
discourage men-whether single or in couples-from being engaged and 
143 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies 10 Remedy the 
Gender Gap, 82 GEO. LJ. 89 (1993) (arguing that the gender wage gap appears to require legal intervention in 
the family and household structure and cannot be achieved by labor market policy alone). 
144 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
145 See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE viii (2002) (arguing that we underestimate the extent of 
neurological sex differences); Elizabeth S. Spelke, Sex Differences in Intrinsic Aptitudefor Math and Science: 
A Critical Review, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 950 (2005) (arguing that we overestimate the extent of neurological sex 
differences); The Science of Gender and Science: Pinker vs. Spelke Debate, Edge: The Third Culture, May 16, 
2005, http://www.edge.orgl3rd_culture/debate05/debate05_index.html. 
146 For example, the propensity to engage in physical violence against other human beings may be 
"natural," but organized societies nonetheless tightly regulate uses of force. 
147 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63, 66 (2000) (acknowledging that "demographic 
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family" and reaffirming parents' 
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the "care, custody, and control" of their children); Pierce v. 
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the rights of parents and guardians "to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control" as an element of constitutional liberty that "excludes 
any general power of the state to standardize its children"). 
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nurturing parents, are gradually eroding. 148 So, too, the taboos against male 
child care workers may be softening. 
Still, for many women, getting men involved in the care of their children is 
hopeless, irrelevant, or affirmatively unwelcome. Today, approximately one 
third of children in the United States live in single-parent families 149 and 90% 
of those are headed by women. 150 Many children are now raised by lesbian 
couples, and straight and lesbian women increasingly are choosing to become 
pregnant-through artificial insemination or otherwise-in circumstances that 
legally and socially exclude the sperm donor from having any paternal role. 
Even for these women, who may not have or particularly wish to have men 
involved in the care of their children, it is nonetheless important that the 
politics of care be seen as a men's issue, too. Social support for care giving is 
likely to be inadequate as long as care giving is thought to be women's domain 
and its conditions only a "women's issue." Women have always prioritized 
care and have needed support to do it well, but the experience of history shows 
that, without a politics of care that implicates men as well, women's needs are 
not a sufficiently high social priority. Even men who are not substantially 
involved in primary care giving should express their commitment to sex 
equality by actively supporting family-friendly law and policy. 
In that regard, the pitch used by a new, energetic, internet-based grassroots 
campaign seeking a range of work-family reforms seems counterproductive. A 
coalition that calls itself "Moms Rising" promotes a policy agenda entitled 
"The Motherhood Manifesto," and consistently refers to the work-family 
policy needs, not of parents, but of "moms.,,151 Part of the feminist effort to 
shift cultural norms toward more representative inclusion of traditionally 
"feminine" values appropriately affIrms using language and imagery familiar 
148 See Robert Pear, Married and Single Parents Spending More Time with Children. Study Finds, N.Y 
TIMES, Oct. 17,2006, at AI2 (reviewing a new book by the Russell Sage Foundation and the American 
Sociological Association entitled Changing Rhythms of American Family Life, and observing that "the amount 
of child care and housework performed by fathers has sharply increased, researchers say in a new study, based 
on analysis of thousands of personal diaries"). 
149 In 2005, 33% of children under 18 lived in single-parent homes. Forum on Family and Child 
Statistics, America's Children in Brief: Key National Indicators of Well-Being (2006), http://www. 
childstats.govl americaschildren/pop.asp. 
150 Jacqueline Kirby, Single Parem Families in Poverty, I HUM. DEV. & FAM. LIFE BULL. I, I (1995). 
151 Several of the organizations working in coalition with Moms Rising are likewise directed at mothers, 
not parents. Mainstreet Moms Operation Blue, Mothers and More, Mothers Movement Online, Mother: The 
Job, Mothers Ought to Have Equal Rights, and the National Partnership for Women and Families are some of 
the groups represented. See About Moms Rising, http://www.momsrising.org/aboutmomsrising (last visited 
Nov. 19,2006). 
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and comfortable to women, as well as grassroots organizing techniques 
pioneered by and for women (e.g., at-home get-togethers at which children are 
welcome). But the public relations strategy here strongly signals that these are 
"women's issues" without importance for men, and its bouncy tone hints that 
the organizations' political work-like a girls' night out-would really be a lot 
less fun if men were involved. To the extent that this approach gives men a 
pass, it should cause concern. 
Further, claiming family issues as women's political turf suggests that 
cultural feminists lack the courage of their convictions. The ethics and traits 
associated with femininity that cultural feminism champions are valuable 
enough that the entire society, not women alone, should aspire to fulfill them. 
The work of Carol Gilligan herself, whose In a Different Voice is viewed as an 
iconic work of cultural feminism, supports greater male involvement in family 
care giving. Although Gilligan generally associates distinct forms of moral 
reasoning with males and females, she is very careful to explain that these are 
only general typologies. 152 Her own conclusion is that moral growth for 
persons whose reasoning might be characterized as masculine would involve 
working to adapt moral insight more typically associated with the feminine, 
and vice versa. I53 In other words, Gilligan's work suggests that it is beneficial 
for women and men both to strive for broader range in terms of their life values 
and experiences by learning more from the "opposite" sex. 
An equality and reproductive rights agenda should thus focus on shifting 
the workplace away from the implicitly male "ideal worker" norm and toward 
an assumption that workers of both sexes have equal potential and 
responsibility as caregivers. It should advocate legal, political, and cultural 
changes that would share the burdens and joys of parenting and bread winning 
more equitably between women and men. Men should not be let off the hook, 
whether on the micro level of care for children, or the macro level of pushing 
for legal and policy changes that better support care giving. By emphasizing 
the extent to which care for society's dependants should be understood as a 
duty of men and women alike, equality analysis can help to make decisions to 
have children more realistic and responsible. 
152 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 1-2 (1982). 
153 [d. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sex equality law is strong and dynamic, yet this Article points to some of 
the work it has yet to do. The hurdles identified here are not trivial. Equal 
protection doctrine has never been stronger in its condemnation of sex-based 
stereotypes, yet in the critical areas of teen sexuality and sex education, our 
culture, politics, and courts have yet to fully repudiate sex-based double 
standards. Promulgation of stereotypes in sex education should be treated as 
unconstitutional for the same reasons that equal protection rejects denial of 
opportunity based on stereotypes. Equal protection, properly understood, is 
not limited to redressing sex-based inequality of educational benefits or 
opportunities, but also forecloses efforts to shape youth behavior in 
stereotypically gendered ways. I have argued for sex education that overtly 
and comprehensively repudiates sexual double standards and the harms they 
help to foster and obscure, and embraces egalitarian social and sexual values. 
The contraceptive equity example shows conflicts within our legal 
understandings of whether and how reproductive distinctiveness triggers sex 
discrimination. Competing strands of existing law treat disadvantage based on 
women's reproductive distinctiveness either as not sex based, or as sex 
discrimination only to the extent that it can be analogized to some male 
circumstance and thus conceptualized as nondistinctive after all. Equality 
analysis of contraceptive coverage suggests that the law should go further to 
support contraceptive equity, not only to make women's health insurance 
benefits as comprehensive as men's, but also to render women and men's 
reproductive distinctiveness equally nondisadvantaging. The law should do so 
by making women's reproductive health needs part of the baseline for 
coverage of facially sex-neutral benefit plans. Discrimination thrives where 
women have attributes-like distinctions in reproductive capacity-that make 
women seem differently situated from men. That is where Geduldig, broadly 
read, cuts equal protection off. If women as reproducing persons are equal to 
men, equality law must account for the circumstances and needs of women as 
normal, baseline human conditions. 
Finally, the work-family conflict underscores how the law and society have 
hesitated to imagine, embrace, and support egalitarian parenting and work. We 
need, paradoxically, both greater and less recognition of mothering. Society 
should expand support for parents of both sexes, and exert cultural and 
institutional pressure on men to do their part. At the same time, women's 
second shift must not be recognized too much in the form of maternal-wall 
HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 989 2006-2007
2007] OUR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 989 
stereotyping and discrimination, which overestimates the extent to which 
parenting interferes with women's workforce performance. Better support for 
care giving and erosion of sex stereotyping would both be facilitated if men 
participated, and were seen to participate, more in the direct provision and in 
the politics of care. Social support offered to "parents" but used by mothers is 
unlikely to be robust and risks intensifying sex discrimination. We disserve 
both sex equality and reproductive rights when we let work-family policy be 
cast as just a "women's issue." 
We sometimes write or teach feminist legal theory as if its various strands 
are in conflict or mutually exclusive-suggesting that a legal thinker or a legal 
reform must be cultural, liberal, dominance, or postmodern feminist, but not all 
of them at once. Equality analyses of reproductive rights illustrate that the 
strands often work best together as a kind of cosmopolitan feminist tl~~ory, 
taking account of all available tools and modes of analysis and using the 
disparate approaches to cross-check and enrich one another. Dominance 
feminism has pointed out the importance of sites of sex subordination-like 
those examined here-that we might otherwise tend to miss, and the 
interconnections between disparate aspects of a patriarchal system, like 
sexuality, procreation, maternity, and work. This Article's three topics also 
underscore the importance of themes associated with liberal feminism--of 
describing and treating people evenhandedly and neutrally, without 
stereotyping, in part to reflect optimism about individual capacities to defy 
expectations, and to open the way concretely and imaginatively for society as a 
whole to become more equitable. Postmodern feminism, recognizing that 
gender is socially constructed and that language plays a major role in 
constructing it, also supports antistereotyping doctrine by helping, for example, 
to explain the harms of propagating sexual double standards, of naturalizing 
"mothering" as a female trait, and of describing work-family balance as a 
"women's issue." Postmodernism also has helped to uncover missing 
discourses of female desire and male vulnerability and shows that both men-
especially gender nonconforming men-and women can be sexually 
victimized. Cultural feminism's embrace of values and needs traditionally 
associated with women and relegated to "feminine" spheres offers a crucial 
corrective to the law's tendency to define "neutrality" in terms that are 
implicitly male or male-privileging-whether they are standards of health 
coverage that exclude contraception, or a norm of the "ideal worker" assumed 
to be unencumbered by family care responsibilities. Cultural feminism seeks 
to shift the center of normative gravity in a "feminine" direction on issues of 
sexuality, procreation, family, and work. In short, dominance feminism shows 
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us why we are angry, liberal feminism keeps us hoping, postmodem feminism 
reminds us to think harder about who "we" are and could be, and cultural 
feminism teaches us that we must still trust our values and ourselves. 
I have suggested here that equal protection and privacy are overlapping 
constitutional grounds for reproductive rights, and that reproductive rights, in 
turn, undergird sex equality. I have sought to do so with the aid of a range of 
analytic tools from feminist legal theory deployed in a cosmopolitan 
theoretical approach that I hope is stronger than the sum of its parts. All of 
these visions of sex equality and reproductive rights are ones that can be shared 
by people whether they view themselves as pro-life or pro-choice. If society 
were willing to recognize the demands of equality in these three areas, there 
might well be less need for abortion. Filling out the reproductive rights agenda 
with measures that make abortion less necessary is one way to seek progress, 
notwithstanding legal and cultural conflict about abortion itself. This Article 
has pointed out some uses of sex equality law to that effect. 
Casting reproductive rights in terms of equality holds promise to recenter 
the debate towards the real stakes for women (and men) of unwanted 
pregnancy and away from the deceptive images of fetus-as-autonomous-being 
that the anti-choice movement has popularized since the advent of 
amniocentesis. Equality analysis may help to elaborate the price for women of 
existing reproductive law and policy. Another possibility, however, is that 
equality analysis of reproductive rights would change very little. If equality 
merely helps women to be as reproductively irresponsible as men, allowing 
women to have sex followed by abortions for unwanted pregnancy, women 
could have formally more equal sexual freedom but are unlikely to advance 
toward sex equality in the ways I call for here. Formalistic equality arguments 
narrowly focused on abortion could actually make substantive equality in areas 
like contraceptive access, work-family policy, and sex education harder rather 
than easier to achieve. As I noted at the outset, if abortion rights are viewed as 
making women more like men, such equalization might legitimate a status quo 
that fails to address the broader set of issues highlighted here. In the end, 
equality analysis of reproductive rights tells us as much about what more we 
might want from equality as it does about why reproductive rights are 
important. 
Resorting to equality law-and an omnivorous approach to equality law at 
that-in support of reproductive rights is not just an opportunistic effort to find 
something that works. Effective, non-stereotyping sex education, full and 
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equal access to contraception, and jobs compatible with family care not only 
enhance reproductive freedom, but thereby promote sex equality. These 
measures are facets of the larger project of empowering women and men to 
become equal agents of our own sexual and procreative destinies. We all 
should be fully eligible for pleasure, safety, health, and-should we elect to 
have children-both parental intimacy and economic empowerment. The turn 
to equal protection as a source of law for reproductive rights is the right way to 
go because, in battles over reproductive rights, sex equality is so centrally at 
stake. 
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